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ABSTRACT
The doctrine of unconstitutional conditions is notoriously opaque and complex, and scholars have long struggled
to explain not only how it functions, but also why it exists in the first place. This Article draws on concepts from
moral philosophy to provide new insight into these two important questions, at a time when clarity is urgently
needed: the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions has increased markedly in current relevance during the Trump
Administration, from challenges to the executive order threatening to defund “sanctuary cities” to the
reimplementation of the “Global Gag Rule,” which prohibits non-governmental organizations that provide
abortion counseling from receive federal funding.
This Article argues that “anticommodification discourse,” a set of arguments that holds certain goods and ideas
must not be treated as “commodities” that can be bought and sold for money, elucidates recent developments in
unconstitutional conditions jurisprudence and provides a coherent theory for how the Supreme Court has approached
these kinds of cases. Moreover, the idea that rights, and even aspects of constitutional structure, should not be
treated as commodities actually provides the normative underpinning for the doctrine’s existence. To demonstrate
the analytical power of anticommodification discourse, the Article applies those principles to explain various
problems in the realm of unconstitutional conditions, including recent Supreme Court cases on the First Amendment
and the Affordable Care Act, the prevalence and acceptance of plea-bargaining, and the constitutional challenge to
President Trump’s executive order on sanctuary cities. In doing so, the Article fills an important gap in the
scholarship on unconstitutional conditions, as scholars have overlooked the importance of anticommodificationist
principles to explaining, understanding, and justifying the unconstitutional conditions doctrine.
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INTRODUCTION
Unconstitutional conditions problems arise when the government
conditions the receipt of a discretionary benefit upon the recipient’s
nonassertion of constitutional rights.1 The doctrine of unconstitutional
conditions is notoriously complex, convoluted, and inconsistent.2 In fact,
given the courts’ incoherent approach(es) in unconstitutional cases, one
commentator has suggested that the term “unconstitutional conditions
1

2

See, e.g., LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 681 (2d ed. 1988); Sullivan, infra
note 21, at 1415 (“The doctrine of unconstitutional conditions holds that government may not grant
a benefit on the condition that the beneficiary surrender a constitutional right, even if the
government may withhold that benefit altogether.”); see also Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Mgmt.
Dist., 570 U.S. 595, 604 (2013) (“[T]he government may not deny a benefit to a person because he
exercises a constitutional right.” (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Regan v. Taxation
with Representation of Wash., 461 U.S. 540, 545 (1983))).
See, e.g., Cox & Samaha, infra note 3, at 62 & n.2 (describing unconstitutional conditions questions
as “notoriously hard” and listing other scholarly attestations to the difficulty); Farber, infra note 20
(characterizing the doctrine as a “quagmire”); Sullivan, infra note 21, at 1416 (referring to the
doctrine as “riven with inconsistencies” and as a “minefield to be traversed gingerly”); Leading
Case, McCutcheon v. FEC, 128 HARV. L. REV. 201, 206 (2014) (“The Court’s application of this
doctrine has been criticized as inconsistent” and “unpredictable.”); Hamburger, infra note 15, at
480 (“This enigma is notoriously complex, and unconstitutional conditions therefore are considered
a sort of Gordian knot.”); Frederick Schauer, Too Hard: Unconstitutional Conditions and the Chimera of
Constitutional Consistency, 72 DENV. L. REV. 989 (1995); TRIBE & MATZ, infra note 10, at 256 (noting
the doctrine is “far from consistent”); Volokh, infra note 3, at 1030 (describing the doctrine as
“incoherent”).
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doctrine” is itself an overly generous misnomer: instead, this body of law is
perhaps better described as “a number of apparently unrelated (and perhaps
incoherent) subdoctrines in different constitutional fields,”3 including Free
Speech,4 Takings,5 criminal procedure,6 and Federalism.7 In light of this
doctrinal disunity, “unconstitutional conditions” is better understood as a
particular type of constitutional puzzle, which arises across varied contexts,
rather than a particular doctrinal test that can be applied to analyze a
constitutional problem.8
Certain scholars have claimed (somewhat derisively) that a paper on
unconstitutional conditions demonstrates an author’s questionable
judgment,9 perhaps partially because of the breadth and depth of the
doctrinal confusion in this area. To the contrary, the pervasiveness of
unconstitutional conditions questions across different constitutional fields is
evidence of its pivotal role in preserving the integrity of our Constitutional
rights and structure.10 This is all the more true in light of the Trump
Administration’s recent efforts to leverage federal funds to pressure cities into

3

4

5
6

7
8

9

10

Alexander Volokh, The Constitutional Possibilities of Prison Vouchers, 72 OHIO ST. L.J. 983, 1030 (2011);
see also Adam B. Cox & Adam M. Samaha, Unconstitutional Conditions Questions Everywhere: The
Implications of Exit and Sorting for Constitutional Law and Theory, 5 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 61, 68 (2013)
(“Whether there ought to be one unified test for this jumble of contexts, there might not ever be.”).
See, e.g., Agency for Int’l Dev. v. All. for Open Soc’y Int’l, Inc., 570 U.S. 205 (2013) (applying the
unconstitutional conditions doctrine to freedom of speech); Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513 (1958)
(same).
See, e.g., Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374 (1994) (applying unconstitutional conditions doctrine
to the Takings Clause); Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987) (same).
United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 118 n.4 (2001) (noting unconstitutional conditions
argument in Fourth Amendment context); United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570, 572 (1968);
United States v. Scott, 450 F.3d 863, 866–67 (9th Cir. 2006); TRIBE, supra note 1, at 184; Melanie
D. Wilson, The Price of Pretrial Release: Can We Afford to Keep Our Fourth Amendment Rights?, 92 IOWA L.
REV. 159, 201–08 (2006).
NFIB v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012); South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203 (1987).
See Cox & Samaha, supra note 3, at 68; see also Mitchell N. Berman, Coercion, Compulsion, and the
Medicaid Expansion: A Study in the Doctrine of Unconstitutional Conditions, 91 TEX. L. REV. 1283, 1316
(2013) (“Better to think and speak of a ‘conditional offer problem’ or a ‘conditional offer puzzle’—
the difficulty of properly analyzing governmental offers of benefits that it is not constitutionally
obligated to provide conditioned on the offeree’s waiver or non-exercise of a constitutional right.”).
This Article will refer to such puzzles as “unconstitutional conditions questions” and will reserve
the term unconstitutional conditions doctrine to refer to cases where courts have invalidated a
particular condition. Cox & Samaha, supra note 3, at 68 & n.12 (distinguishing unconstitutional
conditions questions from unconstitutional conditions doctrine and identifying scholars who use the
term “doctrine” in this way).
Cox & Samaha, supra note 3, at 62 (“You can easily question the judgment of anyone who writes a
paper, even an essay, with ‘unconstitutional conditions’ in the title. The topic is very 1980s and
scholars lost their enthusiasm for it not long after the Go–Go’s broke up.”).
LAURENCE H. TRIBE & JOSHUA MATZ, UNCERTAIN JUSTICE: THE ROBERTS COURT AND THE
CONSTITUTION 256 (2014) (describing the government offers of benefits conditional on the waiver
of rights as a significant and “pervasive” feature of “modern governance).
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enforcing aspects of federal immigration law11 and to discourage
international nonprofits from offering abortion counseling.12
Actually, the ubiquity of unconstitutional conditions questions is a virtue
rather than a vice. Scholars have noted that the unconstitutional conditions
doctrine is not “anchored to any single clause of the Constitution.”13 That is
because the doctrine instead serves as constitutional “glue,” filling in the
interstitial space left between enumerated individual rights and structural
limitations on government power.14 In this way, the unconstitutional
conditions doctrine prevents the modern administrative state from leveraging
its prodigious spending power15 to essentially purchase the waiver of
individual rights16 and to distort our constitutional structure.17 As the
“modern regulatory and welfare state” has expanded and the federal
government has come to provide “more goods, services, and exemptions,”
the government’s opportunities to condition such benefits on the “sacrifice of
constitutional rights” have likewise increased.18 In this context, without the
structural support provided by the interstitial glue of the unconstitutional
conditions doctrine, the constraints our Constitution places on government
power, embodied by the combination of individual rights and structural
11

12

13

14
15

16
17

18

See generally Jeremy Diamond & Euan McKirdy, Judge Issues Blow Against Trump’s Sanctuary City Order,
CNN POLITICS (Nov. 21, 2017, 1:02 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2017/11/21/politics/trumpsanctuary-cities-executive-order-blocked/index.html.
Mark Joseph Stern, Let Chief Justice Roberts Explain Why the Global Gag Rule is Unconstitutional, SLATE
(Jan.
27,
2017
12:37
PM),
http://www.slate.com/blogs/xx_factor/2017/01/27/
the_global_gag_rule_is_unconstitutional_and_john_roberts_can_explain_why.html.
Richard A. Epstein, Foreword, Unconstitutional Conditions, State Power, and the Limits of Consent, 102
HARV. L. REV. 4, 10 (1988); Gary Feinerman, Note, Unconstitutional Conditions: The Crossroads of
Substantive Rights and Equal Protection, 43 STAN. L. REV. 1369, 1370 (1991).
Seminar: Constitutional Silences: Mapping Negative Legal Space, Harvard Law School, Nov. 4,
2015.
Philip Hamburger, Unconstitutional Conditions: The Irrelevance of Consent, 98 VA. L. REV. 479, 481 (2012)
(“[I]t it is widely acknowledged that the powers granted by the Constitution to the government give
it broad authority to spend and to place conditions on its expenditures.”); see also South Dakota v.
Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 206 (1987) (approving Congress’s conditioning of federal funds on compliance
with statutory and administrative directives as a power incident to Spending Power under Article I,
Section 8, Clause 1).
See, e.g., Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513 (1958) (striking down law conditioning tax exemptions of
waiver of freedom of speech).
TRIBE & MATZ, supra note 10, at 255 (“There’s something terribly wrong with the government
breaking out its huge checkbook and buying the ability to violate our rights.”); Hamburger, supra
note 15, at 480 (noting that the implications of unconstitutional conditions questions “are
particularly concrete for the Constitution’s rights and structural limits.”); Ginny Kim, Note,
Unconstitutional Conditions: Is the Fourth Amendment for Sale in Public Housing?, 33 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 165,
178 (1995) (“The government should not be able to use its tremendous spending power in a way
that warps the normal distribution of rights.”).
Cox & Samaha, supra note 3, at 69; see also Cass R. Sunstein, Why the Unconstitutional Conditions Doctrine
Is an Anachronism (with Particular Reference to Religion, Speech, and Abortion), 70 B.U. L. REV. 593, 604
(1990) (“In short, the doctrine filled a particular gap in post-New Deal constitutional theory by
offering a means of placing limits on novel governmental activities.”).
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limits, would collapse;19 the government could simply choose to “contract”
its way around the Constitution.
Unconstitutional conditions questions, therefore, must be more than an
academic “afterthought”20—nothing less than our fundamental liberties and
the integrity of our constitutional structure are at stake.21 President Trump’s
recent executive order aimed at eliminating “sanctuary cities”22 typifies the
problem and has propelled the obscure doctrine of unconstitutional
conditions into the forefront of mainstream political discourse. That order
threatens to withhold payment of billions of dollars in federal funding to cities
unless those cities agree to cooperate with federal immigration law
enforcement officials.23 San Francisco and Santa Clara counties and
Chicago have each filed suit to enjoin this order, and in November 2017,
Judge Orrick of the Northern District of California granted a permanent
injunction to San Francisco and Santa Clara that blocked enforcement of the
executive order nationwide.24 Notably, Judge Orrick’s order relied in part
on the unconstitutional conditions doctrine and its role in preserving the
federalist constitutional structure guaranteed by the Tenth Amendment.25
The primary goal of this Article is theoretical: unconstitutional conditions
plays an essential role in constitutional doctrine, but scholars have long
struggled to “explain why conditions on government benefits that ‘indirectly’
pressure preferred liberties should be as suspect as ‘direct’ burdens on those

19
20

21

22

23

24

25

Hamburger, supra note 15, at 483 (“[T]he [federal] government’s total power or authority consists
of the [enumerated] powers minus the rights and structural limits.”).
Daniel A. Farber, Another View of the Quagmire: Unconstitutional Conditions and Contract Theory, 33 FLA.
ST. U. L. REV. 913, 914 (2006) (“The fact that constitutional rights can be waived is usually
something of an afterthought.”).
Hamburger, supra note 15, at 491 (arguing that significance of unconstitutional conditions, which
have long been treated as peripheral, must be recognized, “for [such conditions] have become a
means of evading much of the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.”); Kathleen M. Sullivan,
Unconstitutional Conditions, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1413, 1419 (1989) (noting unconstitutional conditions
doctrine “identifies a characteristic technique by which government appears not to, but in fact does
burden those liberties, triggering a demand for especially strong justification by the state.”).
A “sanctuary city” is a locality that “refuse[s] to help the federal government enforce its immigration
laws . . . .” Devin Watkins, 5 Ways Trump’s Anti-Sanctuary City Orders Are Unconstitutional, TIME (Mar.
31, 2017), http://time.com/4720749/trump-sanctuary-cities-unconstitutional/.
See id.; Vivian Yee, Judge Blocks Trump Effort to Withhold Money from Sanctuary Cities, N.Y. TIMES, (Apr.
25,
2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/25/us/judge-blocks-trump-sanctuarycities.html?mcubz=0.
Cty. of Santa Clara v. Trump, No. 17-CV-00485-WHO, 2017 WL 5569835, at *2, *13 (N.D. Cal.
Nov. 20, 2017). In a divided opinion, the Ninth Circuit affirmed without relying on the
unconstitutional conditions doctrine. See City & Cty. of San Francisco v. Trump, 897 F.3d 1225,
1234–35 (9th Cir. 2018). Instead, the court of appeals concluded that the executive order violated
the separation of powers doctrine because the withholding of funds lacked congressional
authorization. Id.
Cty. of Santa Clara, 2017 WL 5569835, at *14.
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same rights, such as the threat of criminal punishment.”26 One persuasive,
but incomplete, answer derives from concerns about the distributive impacts
of government offers that condition benefits on the waiver of individual
constitutional rights. It is true that these offers threaten to skew the
distribution of power between the government and rightsholders and to
systematically deprive poorer constituents of constitutional protections.27
Given the government’s deep pockets, it will likely be able to afford to
“purchase” waivers of constitutional rights from individual persons, if such
offers are allowed. Moreover, the offer of rights-for-benefits will be harder
to resist for poorer rightsholders, threatening a constitutional system that
offers differential protection of fundamental rights depending on one’s
socioeconomic status.28 Despite the validity of these distributive concerns,
however, they do not provide a complete theoretical justification for the
doctrine.
This Article draws upon moral philosophical concepts to supplement the
literature on unconstitutional conditions and elucidate its practical value as
an “anticommodification”29 doctrine. This anticommodification theory of
unconstitutional conditions “identifies the harm in [such] conditions as the
. . . treatment of rights as transferable objects.”30 Professor Michael Sandel
has helpfully identified two categories of anticommodification arguments:
coercion arguments based on “inequality” and “corruption” arguments.31
26
27

28
29

30
31

Sullivan, supra note 21, at 1419.
Id. at 1490; Kim, supra note 17, at 168, 178 (expressing concern that poorer people will be
disproportionately affected by government offers to purchase waivers of Fourth Amendment rights
in exchange for public housing).
Cf. Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 19 (1956) (plurality opinion) (raising concerns about differential
justice for poor defendants).
Margaret Jane Radin defines “commodification” as “the social process by which something comes
to be apprehended as a commodity, as well as to the state of affairs once the process has taken
place.” Margaret Jane Radin, Contested Commodities, in RETHINKING COMMODIFICATION: CASES
AND READINGS IN LAW AND CULTURE 81 (Martha M. Ertman & Joan C. Williams eds., 2005)
[hereinafter RETHINKING COMMODIFICATION]. “Commodities,” in turn, are understood to be
“goods or services that are, or could be, bought and sold at some point.” Martha M. Ertman &
Joan C. Williams, Preface to RETHINKING COMMODIFICATION, supra, at 3.
Sullivan, supra note 21, at 1476–77.
Michael J. Sandel, What Money Can’t Buy: The Moral Limits of Markets, in THE TANNER LECTURES
ON HUMAN VALUES 89, 94–96 (Grethe B. Peterson ed., 2000); see also I. Glenn Cohen, Note, The
Price of Everything, the Value of Nothing: Reframing the Commodification Debate, 117 HARV. L. REV. 689, 690
(2003) [hereinafter Cohen, The Price of Everything] (discussing inequality and corruption arguments).
In his Tanner Lectures, Professor Sandel actually calls these two categories “coercion” and
“corruption” arguments. Yet, as Professor Cohen has shown, scholars often group together a
“family” of loosely related but distinct anticommodification arguments concerned with “harming
or wronging” the seller. Cohen, infra note 106, at 75. This family of arguments includes arguments
from coercion, as well as from exploitation, undue inducement, and justified paternalism. In
addition, as Cohen explains, there is a distinct set of concerns, stemming from background
conditions of inequality, about distributive fairness. Id. at 80–81; see also Cohen, The Price of
Everything, supra, at 690–91 (describing “‘access’ formulation” of Sandel’s original coercion objection
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Coercion arguments express concerns about “the injustice that can arise
when people buy and sell things under conditions of severe inequality or dire
economic necessity.”32 A form of the coercion argument partially underlies
the systemic worries about the distributive consequences of unconstitutional
conditions—because of unequal background conditions, poor rightsholders
will “sell” more rights to the government, altering the balance of power
between rightsholders and the government and between classes of
rightsholders.33
On the other hand, corruption objections to
commodification warn that certain moral and civic goods might be degraded
or corrupted if they are valued and exchanged as commodities.34 In short,
from an anticommodificationist perspective, even if background conditions
of socioeconomic inequality, which are the root cause of some of the
aforementioned systemic distributive concerns, were hypothetically
eliminated, there would still be something intrinsically wrong with allowing
the government to condition benefits on the waiver of constitutional rights.35
Unlike previous scholarship, which has effectively repudiated corruption
objections to rights commodification,36 this Article argues that the corruption
objection is essential to an accurate theory of unconstitutional conditions.
First, it claims that the corruption objection in fact partially explains some
recent developments in unconstitutional conditions doctrine in the Roberts
Court,37 with special attention to First Amendment and Federalism cases,
and that it also helps to reconcile the tension between unconstitutional
conditions doctrine and reality of plea bargaining in the criminal justice

32
33

34
35

36

37

in Tanner Lectures, which “focuses on unequal access to the good, given an unfair background
distribution of goods”). In more recent work, Professor Sandel groups together arguments about
harm to the seller and distributive fairness under the umbrella of “inequality” arguments. See
MICHAEL SANDEL, WHAT MONEY CAN’T BUY: THE MORAL LIMITS OF MARKETS 8 (2012).
Consequently, I adopt the umbrella term “inequality arguments” to encompass concerns about
harm to the seller as well as concerns about distributive fairness.
Sandel, supra note 31, at 94.
Sullivan, supra note 21, at 1490. Sullivan actually identifies two distinct distributive problems that
might result from unconstitutional conditions offers. First, horizontal redistribution would lead to
a sort of governmental discrimination, whereby “those who comply with the condition and thereby
get better treatment and those who do not.” Id. at 1496. Second, vertical redistribution threatens
to create a system of “constitutional caste,” whereby different socioeconomic classes have
differential access to constitutional rights. Id. at 1497.
See Sandel, supra note 31, at 94.
Cf. id. at 95 (“The argument from coercion offers no grounds for objecting to the commodification
of goods in a society whose background conditions are fair.”); see also TRIBE & MATZ, supra note 10,
at 255 (expressing moral discomfort at the government purchasing the ability to violate rights).
See Sullivan, supra note 21, at 1489 (“Neither coercion, corruption, nor commodification theories
satisfactorily explain why conditions on benefits that pressure preferred liberties should receive the
same strict scrutiny as ‘direct’ constraints.”).
See Leading Case, supra note 2, at 205 (pointing out that unconstitutional conditions doctrine is
“undergoing something of a renaissance in the Roberts Court”). See generally TRIBE & MATZ, supra
note 10, at 253–81 (analyzing unconstitutional conditions cases of Roberts Court).
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system. Rather than embarking upon the ambitious (and perhaps
foolhardy)38 project of developing a grand unifying metatheory of
unconstitutional conditions,39 this Article simply seeks to revive the relevance
of corruption arguments against the commodification of rights.
The Article’s second claim is normative: the corruption objection
encapsulates a compelling theoretic justification for the doctrine of
unconstitutional conditions in cases involving individual rights and
Federalism values. The only scholar to apply anticommodification theory to
unconstitutional conditions problems ultimately rejected it as a theoretic
justification for the doctrine,40 and none of the more recent literature
explicitly draws upon the corruption thread of the anticommodification
debate.41 This Article builds upon recent scholarly forays into the
38

39

40
41

See, e.g., Mitchell N. Berman, Coercion Without Baselines: Unconstitutional Conditions in Three Dimensions,
90 GEO. L.J. 1, 5 (2001) (“Indeed, a growing chorus of influential voices has begun to maintain that
the search for any ‘comprehensive theory of unconstitutional conditions is ultimately futile.’”).
Compare Frederick Schauer, Too Hard: Unconstitutional Conditions and the Chimera of Constitutional
Consistency, 72 DENV. U. L. REV. 989, 990 (1995) (arguing that a unifying theory is “unlikely to
exist”); Larry Alexander, Impossible, 72 DENV. U. L. REV. 1007 (1995) (agreeing with and attempting
to theoretically account for the accuracy of Schauer’s assessment); Cox & Samaha, supra note 3, at
68 (“Whether there ought to be one unified test for this jumble of contexts, there might not ever
be.”) with Lynn A. Baker, The Prices of Rights: Toward A Positive Theory of Unconstitutional Conditions, 75
CORNELL L. REV. 1185, 1187 (1990) (claiming to identify a “positive theory” of unconstitutional
conditions doctrine, which “reveals substantial underlying consistency in the decisions of the
Warren, Burger, and Rehnquist Courts . . . .”); Thomas W. Merrill, Dolan v. City of Tigard:
Constitutional Rights as Public Goods, 72 DENV. U. L. REV. 859, 862 (1995) (claiming theory of
constitutional rights as “public goods” lends coherence to the doctrine of unconstitutional
conditions).
Roberto L. Corrada, Justifying A Search for A Unifying Theory of Unconstitutional Conditions, 72 DENV. U.
L. REV. 1011, 1013 (1995) (“[A] unifying theory of the doctrine may be attainable, although such
a doctrine is yet to be articulated.”).
Sullivan, supra note 21, at 1476–77.
The most thorough recent scholarly analysis of unconstitutional conditions has rejected the idea
that rights can be “bought and sold,” even if the rightsholder gives her fully informed, uncoerced
consent. Hamburger, supra note 15, at 484; see also Volokh, supra note 3, at 1029 & n.312 (identifying
Hamburger with the view that “the government generally shouldn’t be able to achieve indirectly,
by conditions attached to benefits, what it couldn’t achieve by direct regulation”); Cox & Samaha,
supra note 3, at n.11 (calling Hamburger’s Article the “most recent full-blown treatment [of
unconstitutional conditions] in the law literature”). Another recent commentator has characterized
fundamental constitutional rights as “strong property entitlements,” which are protected by both a
duty of governmental non-interference (through regulation or exercises of police power) and of
governmental non-discrimination “on the basis of whether a particular citizen is or is not willing to
waive such constitutional right.” W. Stephen Westermann, Completing the Cathedral Taxonomy
of Salient Legal Entitlement Forms: With Application of the New Entitlement Forms to Describe
Constitutional Rights, Rationalize the Unconstitutional Conditions Doctrine and Better
Understand Legal Personhood 5–6 (Nov. 12, 2009) (unpublished manuscript),
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1505049; cf. Sullivan, supra note 21, at 1496
(discussing how unconstitutional conditions doctrine protects against horizontal redistribution
between rightsholders). On this view, the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions serves to enforce
against the government the duty of non-discrimination intrinsic to fundamental constitutional
rights.
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unconstitutional conditions thicket, bringing the corruption objection to the
foreground and demonstrating its normative and explanatory force as
applied to unconstitutional conditions questions.
Part I provides an overview of unconstitutional conditions doctrine and
reviews the normative theories of unconstitutional conditions proffered by
prior scholars. Part II summarizes legal and philosophical scholarship to
explain anticommodification discourse and the tools it supplies for analyzing
unconstitutional conditions problems. Part III applies anticommodification
discourse to explain and normatively justify certain unconstitutional
conditions doctrines, including: (1) the Court’s decision in Agency for
International Development v. Alliance for Open Society International, Inc. (“AID”);42
(2) the constitutionality of plea bargaining, despite its similarity to
unconstitutional conditions cases; and (3) Federalism cases, from National
Federation of Independent Businesses (“NFIB”) v. Sebelius43 to the recent
constitutional challenges to the Trump Administration’s sanctuary cities
order. Part IV defends anticommodification discourse, as both a normative
underpinning of and a tool for analyzing unconstitutional conditions
questions, from the criticisms leveled by prior scholarship.
I. UNCONSTITUTIONAL CONDITIONS: CURRENT DOCTRINE AND
THEORIES
Unconstitutional conditions questions arise whenever the “government
offers a benefit on condition that the recipient perform or forego an activity
that a preferred constitutional right normally protects from government
interference.”44 There are three basic elements to unconstitutional
conditions problems.45 First, there must be a rightsholder. (This could be an
individual,46 a corporation,47 or a state.48)49 Therefore, unconstitutional
conditions cases generally fall into two broad categories, depending on the
rightsholder involved: individual rights cases and Federalism cases.50
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49

50

570 U.S. 205 (2013). This case is analyzed in further detail below.
NFIB v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519 (2012).
Cox & Samaha, supra note 3, at 66 (quoting Sullivan, supra note 21, at 1421–22).
See Volokh, supra note 3, at 1029.
See, e.g., Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513 (1958).
See, e.g., Frost & Frost Trucking Co. v. R.R. Comm’n of Cal., 271 U.S. 583 (1926).
See, e.g., NFIB, 567 U.S. 519.
See Sullivan, supra note 21, at 1428–29 (“Historically, unconstitutional conditions doctrine
developed in three major areas of constitutional law: corporate rights against state regulation, state
autonomy from federal encroachment, and individual rights.”).
See, e.g., Jesse H. Choper, Supreme Court and Unconstitutional Conditions: Federalism and Individual Rights, 4
CORNELL J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 460 (1994) (comparing Court’s application of unconstitutional
doctrine to individual rights with Federalism cases).
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Second, the government has discretion to confer a benefit but is not required
to do so.51 These discretionary benefits generally include either exemptions
from taxation or a regulatory burden, or government “largesse,” such as a
direct subsidy, government job, or welfare benefit.52 Third, the government
offers this discretionary benefit to the rightsholder on the condition that the
right is waived.53
A. A Brief Doctrinal History
In Frost & Frost Trucking Co. v. Railroad Commission of California,54 the
Supreme Court encountered a classic example of such a constitutionally
problematic bargain.55 The Court (the same one that decided Lochner56) held
that the California Truck Transportation Act, which would have made
private carriers’ access to California highways conditional upon their
agreement to operate as common carriers, was unconstitutional.57 Because
the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment58 prohibited the
legislature from simply commanding a private carrier to assume common
carrier duties, the Act violated “the principle[ ] that a state is without power
to impose an unconstitutional requirement as a condition for granting a
privilege.”59 Even after the demise of Lochnerist premises60 underlying Frost,
the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions retained significance.
After the New Deal, the expansion of the modern administrative state
contributed to the proliferation of unconstitutional conditions problems.61
Today, “the unconstitutional conditions doctrine serves to mediate the
boundary between constitutional rights and government prerogatives in the

51
52
53
54
55
56

57
58
59
60

61

See Sullivan, supra note 21, at 1424–25; Volokh, supra note 3, at 1029.
Sullivan, supra note 21, at 1424 (citing the definition of “government largesse” in Charles Reich, The
New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733 (1964)).
See Volokh, supra note 3, at 1029 (discussing waiver of rights as condition for discretionary
government benefit).
271 U.S. 583 (1926).
See id. at 584.
Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905). During the so-called Lochner Era, the Supreme Court
struck down many legislative attempts at economic regulations as violations of substantive due
process under the Fourteenth Amendment. See Sullivan, supra note 21, at 1416 n.2 (citing TRIBE,
supra note 1, at 567–74).
Frost, 271 U.S. at 599.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
Frost, 271 U.S. at 598.
See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Lochner’s Legacy, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 873, 880–82 (1987) (describing the
“slow and wavering” demise of Lochner and identifying its end with the Court’s decision in West Coast
Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937)).
Cox & Samaha, supra note 3, at 69; Epstein, supra note 13, at 73; Sunstein, supra note 18, at 604.

May 2019]

CONTRACTING AROUND THE CONSTITUTION

1177

areas of spending, licensing, and employment.”62 During the Warren Court
years, the doctrine was refashioned to protect individual liberties rather than
the economic liberties of corporations.63 Speiser v. Randall64 and Sherbert v.
Verner65 are paradigmatic examples. In Speiser, Justice Brennan, writing for
the Court, invalidated a California law that conditioned veterans’ receipt of
a tax exemption on affirmance of loyalty to the United States government.66
California’s benefits procedure threatened to deter constitutionally protected
speech—in this way, the condition was a governmental attempt to indirectly
accomplish what the First Amendment forbid it from enacting directly.67
Similarly, in Sherbert, the Employment Security Commission of South
Carolina denied a former state government employee’s application for
unemployment benefits after she was fired for refusing to work on Saturday
in accordance with her religious faith.68 In another Brennan opinion, the
Court analogized to Speiser, finding South Carolina’s denial of benefits
violated the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment69: just as the
conditional tax exemption in Speiser deterred constitutionally-protected
speech, South Carolina’s attempt to “condition the availability of benefits
upon [Ms. Sherbert’s] willingness to violate a cardinal principle of her
religious faith effectively penalize[d] the free exercise of her constitutional
liberties.”70
As future courts continued to grapple with unconstitutional conditions
questions in the First Amendment realm, however, the doctrine became
notoriously muddled and inconsistent.71 Most recently, the Roberts Court
62
63

64
65
66
67
68
69
70
71

Sunstein, supra note 18, at 593.
See Sullivan, supra note 21, at 1416 (“[T]he doctrine of unconstitutional conditions reemerged under
the Warren Court to protect personal liberties of speech, association, religion, and privacy just as it
once had protected the economic liberties of foreign corporations and private truckers.”).
357 U.S. 513 (1958).
374 U.S. 398 (1963).
Speiser, 357 U.S. at 528–29.
Id. at 526.
Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 399–401. Ms. Sherbert was a member of the Seventh-day Adventist Church.
Saturday is the Sabbath Day of the Seventh-Day Adventist Church. Id. at 399 n.1.
U.S. CONST. amend. I.
Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 406.
Compare Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 192 (1991) (upholding Department of Health and Human
Services regulations that conditioned family planning organizations’ access to federal funds on
organizations’ agreement to refrain from discussing abortion as a lawful family planning option
because speech restrictions were related to the purpose of the government funding), with Legal
Servs. Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533, 549 (2001) (striking down law conditioning civil legal aid
organizations’ receipt of federal funds on organizations’ abstention from challenging
constitutionality of welfare laws). See also Farber, supra note 20, at 927–28 (discussing Rust’s
germaneness test, contrasting Velazquez, and suggesting the two cases might be irreconcilable);
Volokh, supra note 3, at 1030 (describing First Amendment unconstitutional conditions doctrine as
“strict in theory, complicated in fact”); Sullivan, supra note 21, at 1416–17 (noting doctrinal
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ventured into the doctrinal morass in Agency for International Development (“AID”)
v. Alliance for Open Society International, Inc.,72 holding that the United States
Leadership Against HIV/AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria Act violated the
First Amendment by conditioning the receipt of federal funds on U.S-based
international aid organizations’ express avowal of an anti-prostitution
policy.73
The Roberts Courts also grappled with unconstitutional conditions upon
“states’ rights” in one of its most publicly salient and politically-charged
decisions: NFIB v. Sebelius.74 In the relevant portion of that opinion,75 the
Court struck down the “Medicaid Expansion” provision of the Affordable
Care Act (“ACA”) under the unconstitutional conditions doctrine.76 The
ACA “dramatically increased” states’ Medicaid obligations, requiring that,
among other things, states’ “expand their Medicaid programs by 2014 to
cover all individuals under the age of 65 with incomes below 133 percent of
the federal poverty line.”77 In order to induce state compliance, the Act
conditioned states’ continued receipt of preexisting medical funds on
acceptance of the expansion.78 The Court held that this condition, which
threatened states with the “loss of over 10 percent” of their annual budgets,
was unconstitutionally coercive, leaving the states with “no real option but to
acquiesce.”79 Although the Chief Justice80 grounded his reasoning in prior

72
73
74
75
76
77
78
79
80

inconsistency between Arkansas Writers’ Project, Inc. v. Ragland, 481 U.S. 221 (1987), and Harris v.
McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980) and Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977), as well as tension between Regan
v. Taxation with Representation, 461 U.S. 540 (1983) and FCC v. League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. 364
(1984)). Sullivan also points out that after Sherbert, “the Court has rejected every other claim that
conditions on food stamps or welfare payments unconstitutionally burden rights to speech,
expressive association, intimate association, or freedom from unwarranted searches.” Sullivan,
supra note 21, at 1417. For example, in Lyng v. Int’l Union, United Automobile, Aerospace & Agricultural
Implement Workers of America, UAW, 485 U.S. 360 (1988), the Court rejected a First Amendment
challenge to the constitutionality of an amendment to the Food Stamp Act, which precluded a
household’s eligibility “to participate in the food stamp program during the time that any member
of the household is on strike or shall increase the allotment of food stamps that it was receiving
already because the income of the striking member has decreased.” 485 U.S. at 362, 364, 366,
369; see also Sullivan, supra note 21, at 417 & n.11 (discussing Lyng).
570 U.S. 205 (2013). This case is analyzed in further detail below.
Id. at 221. See generally TRIBE & MATZ, supra note 10, at 259–64.
See, e.g., Berman, supra note 8, at 1283 (describing NFIB decision as “feverishly anticipated”). See
generally TRIBE & MATZ, supra note 10, at 271–77.
NFIB produced three separate holdings. See Berman, supra note 8, at 1283–84.
NFIB v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 588 (2012).
Id. at 576.
Id. at 581.
Id. at 582; TRIBE & MATZ, supra note 10, at 273.
Technically, the Chief Justice wrote for a plurality of the Court, joined only by Justices Kagan and
Breyer. In an unsigned joint dissent, Justices Alito, Kennedy, Scalia, and Thomas also agreed the
Medicaid expansion was unconstitutionally coercive. NFIB, 567 U.S. at 681 (Scalia, Kennedy,
Thomas, Alito, J.J., dissenting); see also Berman, supra note 8, at 1286 n.16 (discussing the joint
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precedent, relying on South Dakota v. Dole,81 the Court had never before struck
down a spending condition as unconstitutionally coercive of the states before
NFIB.82 This decision serves to highlight the disconnect between the Court’s
approach to unconstitutional conditions in federalism cases and individual
rights cases.83
This doctrinal inconsistency is not cabined to the individual rights vs.
federalism dichotomy; instead, inconsistency is a pervasive feature of
unconstitutional conditions doctrine generally. The individual rights cases
discussed above primarily related to conditions on Free Speech, which might
be considered “the paradigmatic constitutional right.”84 Consequently, it is
unsurprising that the Court has applied the unconditional doctrine with
particular stringency in the First Amendment context.85 Yet since the
doctrine’s inception in the 1800s, the Court has applied a staggering variety
of doctrinal tests across a variety of constitutional contexts.86 While
conditions upon the Takings Clause87 must be roughly proportional and
must demonstrate an “essential nexus,”88 conditions on the Fourth
Amendment right against unreasonable searches are subject to a
“reasonableness” analysis (at least in the employment context).89 As a result,
the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions generally is “best understood not
as a single, large, and intricate portrait, but rather as a quilt of smaller,
individually complete segments framed by a single broad border.”90

81
82

83

84
85

86
87
88
89
90

dissenting opinion in NFIB). The votes of these four “joint dissenters” were necessary to constitute
a majority on the unconstitutionality of the Medicaid expansion. Id.
483 U.S. 203, 209 (1987) (upholding law conditioning federal highway funds on states’ adoption of
drinking age of twenty-one).
See NFIB, 567 U.S. at 625 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part, concurring in the judgment, and
dissenting in part) (“The Chief Justice therefore—for the first time ever—finds an exercise of Congress’
spending power unconstitutionally coercive.”); TRIBE & MATZ, supra note 10, at 273.
See Choper, supra note 50, at 463 (arguing Court should not apply a “coercion” test in Federalism
cases and noting that coercion is “certainly” not the test used in individual rights cases); Peter A.
Clodfelter & Edward J. Sullivan, Substantive Due Process Through the Just Compensation Clause:
Understanding Koontz’s “Special Application” of the Doctrine of Unconstitutional Conditions by Tracing the
Doctrine’s History, 46 URB. LAW. 569, 581 (2014) (claiming that the “Court has been more receptive
to individual’s arguments” than Federalism arguments); Volokh, supra note 3, at 1030.
Farber, supra note 20, at 920.
See Volokh, supra note 3, at 1030 (characterizing First Amendment unconstitutional conditions
doctrine as "strict in theory, complicated in fact" (footnotes omitted)); Westermann, supra note 41,
at 15 (noting "the Court applies the unconstitutional conditions doctrine strictly with respect to First
Amendment rights but flexibly with respect to constitutionally protected economic rights").
Clodfelter & Sullivan, supra note 83, at 570–71.
U.S. CONST. amend. V.
Volokh, supra note 3, at 1030 (citing Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374 (1994); Nollan v. Cal.
Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987)).
Id. at 1030 (citing Nat’l Treasury Emps. Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 664, 671 n.2, 678–79
(1989)).
Baker, supra note 38, at 1196.
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B. The Theories: What Should a Doctrine of Unconstitutional Conditions Do?
Given this “doctrinal mess,” it is unsurprising that scholars have put forth
a plethora of normative approaches to unconstitutional conditions
questions.91 These ideas can be broadly sorted into two scholarly camps.92
The first camp would treat constitutional rights no differently from property
rights—an individual may waive or decline to exercise her constitutional
rights, so why should she be prevented from exchanging such rights for a
benefit? In fact, from this perspective, to block such an exchange of rights for
money would be inefficient93: in unconstitutional conditions cases, “people
sell their constitutional rights in ways that, they believe, make them better
off. They prefer the benefits of the agreement to the exercise of their right.”94
Many more scholars have adopted a second normative orientation,
which supports the application of the unconstitutional conditions doctrine to
block certain exchanges of rights for benefits.95 The scholars in the second
camp, however, have offered a wide array of potential justifications for this
general position. Some, such as Seth Kreimer and Mitchell Berman, identify
coercion as the key symptom of constitutional infirmity in such exchanges.96
Richard Epstein, on the other hand, suggests that unconstitutional conditions
91

92
93

94

95
96

Farber, supra note 20, at 928 (recounting the approach championed by Justice Kennedy); Berman,
supra note 8, at 1316 n.142 (“You could read a dozen scholarly discussions of ‘the unconstitutional
conditions doctrine’ before running into a clear statement of what the doctrine is supposed to say
or what its content is.”); Cox & Samaha, supra note 3, at 68 (“There are plenty of ideas. It is just
that there are no set doctrines for analyzing the question.”).
Volokh, supra note 3, at 1030.
See, e.g., N. Gregory Mankiw, Emerging Markets as Partners, Not Rivals, N.Y. TIMES, (Feb. 12, 2011),
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/02/13/business/13view.html?_r=5&ref=business (“Unlike a
sports contest, which by necessity has a winner and a loser, a voluntary economic transaction
between consenting consumers and producers typically benefits both parties.”).
Frank H. Easterbook, Insider Trading, Secret Agency, Evidentiary Privileges, and the Production of Information,
1981 SUP. CT. REV. 309, 347; see also Sullivan, supra note 21, at 1478 (discussing Easterbrook’s
position); Farber, supra, note 20, at 915 (claiming that bartering of constitutional rights “may seem
paradoxical, but it should not be: having a right often means being free to decide on what terms to
exercise it or not”); Volokh, supra note 3, at 1029 (“One could adopt a laissez-faire attitude and
allow such deals generally, on the theory that this contract, like most voluntary transactions,
presumptively benefits both parties.” (citing W. Union Tel. Co. v. Kansas, 216 U.S. 1, 53
(1910) (Holmes, J., dissenting); McAuliffe v. Mayor of New Bedford, 29 N.E. 517 (Mass. 1892)
(Holmes, J.)); Westermann, supra note 41, at 5 (“[S]cholars have debated whether fundamental
constitutional rights are properly viewed as property entitlements or mere default-rule privileges.”).
See Volokh, supra note 3, at 1029 (describing this second orientation in the scholarly literature).
See Seth Kreimer, Allocational Sanctions: The Problem of Negative Rights in a Positive State, 132 U. PA. L.
REV. 1293, 1301 (1984) (claiming “a threat abridges [constitutional] rights in ways an offer does
not,” and suggesting “history,” “equality,” and “predictability” as “appropriate baseline[s]” against
which coercion can be detected); Berman, supra note 38, at 6 (arguing a “governmental offer is
(presumptively) unconstitutional if it is coercive, and that coercion has a coherent meaning supplied
by bedrock constitutional logic that transcends the particularities that govern a specific region of
constitutional law”); see also Berman, supra note 8, at 1287 n.19 (describing coercion as “the
distinctive, but not the sole, constitutional wrong that conditional offers might instantiate”).
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doctrine rightly blocks exchanges that would otherwise result in
“redistribution of wealth along forbidden dimensions.”97 Kathleen Sullivan
has crafted yet another normative justification, locating the value of the
doctrine in the systemic preservation of a particular distribution of rights.98
Phillip Hamburger advocates for perhaps the strongest brand of the
unconstitutional conditions doctrine, justifying the doctrine as a means of
preventing governmental circumvention of constitutionally-prescribed limits
on government power.99
It is true that, as a practical matter, the Court has generally charted a
“middle course” between these two scholarly positions.100 This Article,
however, decisively sides with scholars in the second camp, arguing along
with Hamburger and others101 that the government should be presumptively
prohibited from conditioning receipt of a benefit on waiver of an individual’s
constitutional rights.102 For a normative justification of this position, and a
partial descriptive explanation of the Court’s “middle course,” the Article
turns to anticommodification discourse.
II. ANTICOMMODIFICATION THEORY
The scholarly debate over commodification seeks to “[a]rticulat[e] a
principled line between what can and cannot permissibly be sold.”103
Academic perspectives can generally be divided into two broad schools of
thought on such questions. The pro-commodification camp defends, on
freedom of contract grounds, the moral desirability of legal markets in
“adoption, human organs, military service, and everything else,”104 including
constitutional rights.105 Anticommodificationists, on the other hand,
question the moral propriety of valuing certain goods in market terms106 and
97
98
99

100
101

102
103
104
105
106

Epstein, supra note 13, at 97.
See Sullivan, supra note 21, at 1424 nn. 32–34, 1489–1505.
Hamburger, supra note 15, at 492 (“By casting restrictions on liberty in terms of conditions rather
than direct constraints, the government can escape not only its limited powers but also most of the
limits on such powers, including most of the Bill of Rights.”).
See Volokh, supra note 3, at 1030.
Lloyd Hitoshi Mayer, Nonprofits, Speech, and Unconstitutional Conditions, 46 CONN. L. REV. 1045, 1049
(2014) (arguing that “speech rights are generally inalienable as against the government under the
First Amendment, and therefore any abridgement of such rights by the government—whether
direct or indirect—is subject to strict scrutiny.”).
In the conclusion, this Article suggests, as did Sullivan, supra note 21, at 1492 n.342, that a parallel
analysis could be developed for Federalism cases.
Cohen, The Price of Everything, supra note 31, at 689; see also Ertman & Williams, supra note 29, at 1–2.
Ertman & Williams, supra note 29, at 2.
See, e.g., Easterbrook, supra note 94.
Like Professor Cohen, this Article understands markets in a broad sense, operating whenever a
good “is provided due to the inducement of monetary or nonmonetary compensation, in whole or
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ground their resistance to the commodification of certain goods, services, and
relationships in non-market values such as equality, dignity, and solidarity.107
Kantian ethics, for example, draw a sharp line dividing the proper valuation
of persons and the proper valuation of things, based on respect for human
rationality: “In the Kingdom of Ends everything has a price or a dignity.
Whatever has a price can be replaced by something else as its equivalent; on
the other hand, whatever is above all price, and therefore admits of no
equivalent, has a dignity.”108 Thus, from the Kantian perspective, there are
only two modes of valuation: persons are valued according to respect, while
things are valued according to use.109 While not all anticommodificationists
subscribe to Kant’s binary system of valuation, they are united by their
rejection of the monistic, market-based valuation system of the
commodificationists.110
Prior scholarship has soundly rejected
anticommodification discourse as a theoretical justification for the

107

108

109

110

in part.” See I. Glenn Cohen, Regulating the Organ Market: Normative Foundations for Market Regulation,
77 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 71, 71 n.1 (2014).
See Ertman & Williams, supra note 29; Sandel, supra note 31, at 93–94 (arguing against “the
extension of markets and of market-oriented thinking to spheres of life once thought to lie beyond
their reach.”); see also ELIZABETH ANDERSON, VALUE IN ETHICS AND ECONOMICS 166 (1993)
(“The realization of some forms of freedom, autonomy and welfare demands that certain goods be
produced, exchanged, and enjoyed outside of market relations or in accordance with non-market
norms.”); SANDEL, supra note 31, at 79 (“As markets and market-oriented thinking reach into
spheres of life traditionally governed by nonmarket norms—health, education, procreation, refugee
policy, environmental protection—this dilemma arises more and more often. What should we do
when the promise of economic growth or economic efficiency means putting a price on goods we
consider priceless?”); MICHAEL WALZER, SPHERES OF JUSTICE 103 (1983) (“[I]f money answereth
all things, it does so, as it were, behind the backs of many of the things and in spite of their social
meanings.”); Margaret Jane Radin, Market-Inalienability, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1849, 1851 (1987)
(arguing the “characteristic rhetoric of economic analysis is morally wrong when it is put forward
as the sole discourse of human life” and proposing instead that “we should evaluate inalienabilities
in connection with our best current understanding of the concept of human flourishing” (emphasis
added)); Joan C. Williams & Viviana A. Zelizer, To Commodify or Not to Commodify: That is Not the
Question, in RETHINKING COMMODIFICATION, supra note 29, at 362, 365 (describing the “hostile
worlds theory” in “contemporary critiques of commodification” and citing ROBERT KUTTNER,
EVERYTHING FOR SALE: THE VIRTUES AND LIMITS OF MARKETS (1999)); ROBERT E. LANE, THE
LOSS OF HAPPINESS IN MARKET DEMOCRACIES (2000); JEREMY RIFKIN, THE AGE OF ACCESS:
THE NEW CULTURE OF HYPERCAPITALISM WHERE ALL OF LIFE IS A PAID-FOR EXPERIENCE
(2000)).
IMMANUEL KANT, GROUNDWORK FOR THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 93 (Lara Denis ed.,
2005); Cohen, The Price of Everything, supra note 31, at 706 (quoting Kant); Anderson, supra note 107,
at 9.
Anderson, supra note 107, at 9; cf. Sally Satel, Joshua C. Morrison & Rick K. Jones, State OrganDonation Incentives Under the National Organ Transplant Act, 77 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 217, 235
(2014) (“[M]any advocates for donor compensation believe the potential for corruption to be
illusory; the only thing capable of informing this debate would be future experimentation with
different policies.”).
See Cohen, The Price of Everything, supra note 31, at 697–98; see also Anderson, supra note 107, at 141
(embracing pluralist, rather than monist, theory of value and arguing for “more stringent limits on
markets than most liberal theories”).
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unconstitutional conditions doctrine. The goal of this section is to
demonstrate that this view is mistaken111 and to thereby revive the normative
relevance of anticommodification.112
A. Anticommodification: A Taxonomy
Anticommodification arguments have continued to evolve, and these
contemporary developments can add significantly to our understanding of
the theoretical groundwork for enigmatic questions of unconstitutional
conditions.113
Professor Michael Sandel, a leading voice in the
anticommodification debate, has offered a useful binary framework,
organizing anticommodification arguments into two major categories.114
The first category is arguments from inequality115: such objections are
grounded in concerns about “the injustice that can arise when people buy
and sell things under conditions of severe inequality or dire economic
necessity.”116 As Professor Glenn Cohen has demonstrated, however, this
first category actually encompasses a set of related but distinct arguments,
which must be further subdivided for the sake of conceptual clarity.117
Following Cohen, this paper subdivides inequality arguments into: (a)
consent-based concerns about harms to the “seller” (or the rightsholder, in
unconstitutional conditions problems) (“consent-based concerns”); and (b)
distributive fairness concerns.118
111

112

113

114
115
116
117
118

Note that I do not, however, dispute the validity of Sullivan’s systemic concerns about the
distribution of rights. Instead, I re-categorize these concerns as examples of the “coercion”
subcategory of contemporary anticommodification discourse, and I argue that Sullivan was too
quick to dismiss the relevance of a second subcategory of arguments against commodification:
corruption objections.
For skepticism on the utility of the commodity/non-commodity, dichotomy, see generally Williams
& Zelizer, supra note 107. Cf. Sally Satel, Joshua C. Morrison, & Rick K. Jones, State Organ-Donation
Incentives Under the National Organ Transplant Act, 77 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 217 (2014) (“[M]any
advocates for donor compensation believe the potential for corruption to be illusory; the only thing
capable of informing this debate would be future experimentation with different policies.”); see also
Cohen, The Price of Everything, supra note 31, at 697–98; Anderson, supra note 107, at 141 (embracing
pluralist, rather than monist, theory of value and arguing for “more stringent limits on markets than
most liberal theories”).
See generally Margaret Jane Radin & Madhavi Sunder, The Subject and Object of Commodification, in
RETHINKING COMMODIFICATION, supra note 29 (charting the evolution of the commodification
debate); SANDEL, supra note 31, (discussing trends in various industries).
See Sandel, supra note 31, at 94–95; Cohen, The Price of Everything, supra note 31, at 690.
See supra note 31 (explaining my derivation of the term “inequality arguments” to reference this
category).
Sandel, supra note 31, at 94.
See Cohen, supra note 106, at 75; Cohen, The Price of Everything, supra note 31, at 690.
Cohen, supra note 106, at 75–80. In an earlier analysis, Cohen subdivided Sandel’s coercion
category into “voluntariness” and “access” formulations. The voluntariness formulation would
“ask[ ] whether consent to the transaction was truly voluntary, given society’s background
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Figure 1 - Taxonomy of Anticommodification Arguments119
B. Consent-Based Inequality Objections
Consent-based concerns encompass four objections: (1) coercion; (2)
exploitation; (3) undue influence; and (4) justified paternalism. Within this
subcategory, coerced consent is perhaps most familiar, given its centrality in
unconstitutional conditions case law.120 In anticommodification literature,
coercion refers to “the claim that poor sellers are improperly forced into
selling [a good] . . . by recipients who have no right to propose [the sale],
because the sellers have no reasonable economic alternative.”121

119
120

121

distribution of resources.” Cohen, The Price of Everything, supra note 31, at 690. This subdivision
tracks what I refer to as “coercion” concerns, drawing on Cohen’s later work. Similarly, the access
formulation, which “focuses on unequal access to the good, given an unfair background distribution
of goods,” tracks what I refer to as distributive concerns. Id.
This diagram of the taxonomy is adapted from, and a slight elaboration upon, Cohen, The Price of
Everything, supra note 31, at 689.
See Sullivan, supra note 21, 1428 (“[T]he Court has repeatedly suggested that the problem with
unconstitutional conditions is their coercive effect.”); Berman, supra note 38, at 12 (noting concept
of coercion “captures the essence of what appears to be wrong in many unconstitutional conditions
cases” and that “the Supreme Court has flirted for generations with the notion that conditional
offers may prove unconstitutional by reason of their being coercive.”); NFIB v. Sebelius, 567 U.S.
519, 580 (2012); South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 204 (1987) (holding condition “not so
coercive as to pass the point at which pressure turns into compulsion”); Hobbie v. Unemployment
Appeals Comm’n of Fla., 480 U.S. 136, 144 (1987) (“In Sherbert, Thomas, and the present case, the
employee was forced to choose between fidelity to religious belief and continued employment; the
forfeiture of unemployment benefits for choosing the former over the latter brings unlawful
coercion to bear on the employee’s choice.”).
Cohen, supra note 106, at 75. Mitchell Berman provides an alternative but equivalent definition of

coercion:
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In classic commodification debates, such as the moral permissibility of
paid surrogacy, coercion is the basis for concerns that only destitute “women
[will] consent to commercial surrogacy because the $10,000 reward
represents an offer they cannot (autonomously) refuse.”122 In the
unconstitutional conditions context, coercion objections manifest as concerns
that the poor will waive their constitutional rights (i.e. under the Fourth
Amendment) in exchange for financial benefits,123 or that Congress will
“us[e] offers of federal funds to coerce states to accede to conditions that
Congress could not mandate.”124
Besides coercion, other anticommodification arguments based on harm
to the “seller” do not feature as prominently in unconstitutional conditions
case law or commentary. Exploitation occurs where the buyer benefits from
the transaction, the transaction is either harmful or unfair to the seller, and
the buyer induces the seller to agree by taking advantage of a vulnerability
on the seller’s part, without which the seller would not ordinarily agree to the
transaction.125 Exploitation can occur even without coercion (i.e. where the
buyer has every right to make the offer in question).126 In the context of
organ sales, a much-debated commodification case, buyers might exploit
organ sellers if the sale somehow harms the seller127 or if “the buyer induced
the seller to sell at a [low price] by taking unfair advantage of the seller’s
poverty or other need, without which the seller would not have sold the
organ.”128 In the realm of unconstitutional conditions, exploitation might
occur in a case like Velazquez,129 where the government perhaps capitalized

122
123

124
125
126
127

128
129

[C]oercion is the wrong of exerting wrongful pressure on a subject to do as the coercer
wishes. And the usual way in which one puts wrongful pressure on a target’s choices is by
threatening to wrong him if he does not comply with the threatener’s “demand” or
“condition.” Roughly, then, a threat is coercive, or constitutes coercion, if it would be
wrongful for the threatener to carry it out.
Berman, supra note 8, at 1292 (footnotes omitted).
Cohen, supra note 106, at 75.
See, e.g., Jordan C. Budd, A Fourth Amendment for the Poor Alone: Subconstitutional Status and the Myth of the
Inviolate Home, 85 IND. L.J. 355, 369 n.107 (2010) (discussing coercion in the context of Fourth
Amendment conditions) ; Wyman v. James, 400 U.S. 309, 341 (1971) (Marshall, J., dissenting)
(noting coercive nature of home-visit condition for receipt of welfare benefits).
Berman, supra note 8, at 1308.
Cohen, supra note 106, at 78.
Cohen, The Price of Everything, supra note 31, at 690.
In the context of regulated organ sales, this objection may be relatively weak: “the most widely
discussed form of organ sale, kidney sale, is not terribly dangerous if performed in good conditions.”
Stephen Wilkinson, The Sale of Human Organs, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHIL. (Oct. 22, 2015),
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/organs-sale/#HarRis. As Cohen explains, the proper test for
whether a seller is harmed is “whether ex ante the seller is all things considered better off.” I. Glenn
Cohen, Transplant Tourism: The Ethics and Regulation of International Markets for Organs, 41 J. LAW, MED.,
& ETHICS 269, 274 (2013).
Cohen, supra note 106, at 78.
531 U.S. 533 (2001).
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on the dire financial situation of civil legal aid organizations by offering such
organizations federal funds in exchange for waiver of their First Amendment
right to challenge the constitutionality of federal welfare laws. While
exploitation occurs when the seller accepts a “raw deal,” the undue
inducement argument worries that sellers are “being paid too much, the
‘offer [is] too good to refuse,’” such that their autonomy is compromised and
the sale not fully voluntary.130 Strains of the “undue inducement” argument,
for instance, were present in NFIB, in both the contention that “every State
would have no real choice but to go along with the Medicaid Expansion”
and the Government’s argument that the “offer of federal funds associated
with the expanded coverage is such a generous gift that no State would want
to turn it down.”131
The three consent-based objections discussed so far (coercion,
exploitation, and undue influence) all stem from concerns about imperfect
consent.132 This anxiety about tainted consent is grounded in Kantian ethics,
which hold that “humans cannot realize their true nature as free and rational
beings if they are unduly influenced” by financial pressures.133 The fourth
seller-harm objection, “justified paternalism,” sets an even higher bar for
morally satisfactory consent: the anti-paternalist objects to transactions
where consent is perceived to be “involuntary, uninformed, or otherwise
invalid because the seller lacks competence,” regardless of any formal
consent by the seller.134 From this perspective, blocking an organ sale
protects the seller from taking an action that she might have avoided with
perfect information.135
Justified paternalism is perhaps particularly
persuasive for blocking market-exchanges in light of recent literature on
cognitive biases, such as “present bias (or a “particular desire for immediate
consumption” or gratification) and optimism bias (the tendency of a person’s
expectations to be better than actual outcomes).”136 Paternalist intervention
against the commodification of rights might therefore also be justified by a

130
131
132

133
134
135

136

Cohen, supra note 106, at 78.
NFIB v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 673, 681 (2012).
See, e.g., Sandel, supra note 31, at 94 (“[M]arket exchanges are not necessarily as voluntary as market
enthusiasts suggest. A peasant may agree to sell his kidney or cornea in order to feed his starving
family, but his agreement is not truly voluntary. He is coerced, in effect, by the necessities of his
situation.”).
Cohen, The Price of Everything, supra note 31, at 690 (citing IMMANUEL KANT, GROUNDING FOR
THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 434 (James W. Ellington trans., 1981) (1785)).
Cohen, supra note 106, at 79.
See Louis W. Fisher, Note, Paying for Pushout: Regulating Landlord Buyout Offers in New York City’s RentStabilized Apartments, 50 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 491, 514-515 (2015) (internal citations omitted)
(discussing research on how cognitive biases distort rational decision making).
Id. at 515.
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concern that rightsholders might systematically undervalue their rights and
waive their rights in return for less valuable benefits.137
C. Distributive Inequality Objections
In addition to consent-based objections, anticommodification theorists
also rely on arguments about distributive unfairness. Given background
conditions of inequality, the commodification of scarce goods will lead to
unequal access to the goods.138 As Professor Sandel puts it, “[i]n a society
where everything is for sale, life is harder for those of modest means.”139
Thus, as commodification proliferates as a mode of valuation through
different realms of society, including political access, healthcare, and
education, the distribution of wealth comes to dictate the distribution of more
and more socially valuable goods. As income inequality has widened, its
effects have thus been exacerbated by “the commodification of everything”
which has “ma[de] money matter more.”140
In fact, legal scholars have long recognized distributive inequality as one
of the primary normative concerns underlying the unconstitutional
conditions doctrine.141 From this perspective, constitutional rights not only
protect individual rightsholders but also, crucially, such rights help secure a
particular distribution of power between the government and rightsholders
and between different classes of rightsholders.142 The argument, in its
simplest form, is that poor rightsholders will “sell” more rights to the
government, altering the initial distribution of power set by fundamental
constitutional rights.143 While distributive inequality concerns certainly

137

138

139
140

141

142
143

Cf. id. (“Moreover, ‘present biased’ thinking causes tenants to irrationally overvalue receiving a
smaller sum immediately. Tenants thus accept buyout deals that are insufficient to sustain them in
establishing a new tenancy and in exchange, they give up their access to affordable, rent-stabilized
housing.” (footnotes omitted)).
Cohen, supra note 31, at 690; Cohen, supra note 106, at 79. In The Price of Everything, the earlier of
the two pieces, Cohen referred to this objection as the “access formulation” of the coercion
objection. Cohen, supra note 31, at 690.
SANDEL, supra note 31, at 8.
Id.; see also Cohen, supra note 31, at 690 (giving several examples of distributive inequality resulting
from commodification); Cohen, supra note 106, at 79 (discussing unfair distributive effects as an
objection to organ sales).
See Sullivan, supra note 21, at 1486 (“In the end only the distributive strand helps to capture the
problem with unconstitutional conditions, and even the distributive argument must be recast to fit
this context.”).
Id. at 1490.
Id. Sullivan actually identifies two distinct distributive problems that might result from
unconstitutional conditions offers. First, “horizontal redistribution” would lead to a sort of
governmental discrimination, whereby “those who comply with the condition and get better
treatment” than those who do not. Id. at 1496. Second, “vertical distribution” threatens to create

1188

JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

[Vol. 21:5

animate the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions, previous scholars have
been too quick to dismiss other aspects of anticommodification theory144 as a
theoretical justification for unconstitutional conditions doctrine. More
specifically, such scholars have overlooked the second category of
anticommodification arguments: the corruption objection.
D. The Corruption Objection
In addition to arguments from inequality, scholars have mounted a
second, distinct objection to commodification, which Sandel refers to as the
“corruption objection.”145
The corruption objection holds that
commodifying a particular good, service, or practice will denigrate, demean,
or otherwise do violence to our shared understanding of how such goods,
services, or practices should properly be valued.146 From this perspective,
there are multiple spheres147 or modes148 of valuation; corruption occurs
when an exchange occurs without regard to these distinct modes of valuation,
thus treating incommensurable goods as if they were commensurable.149 For
example, from a Kantian perspective, organ sales, even if perfectly
consensual, are categorically impermissible, because the value of the human
body and the value of money are incommensurable: the body is not properly
valued as an object for use with a price but instead possesses a higher intrinsic
value based on human dignity.150

144

145

146
147
148
149
150

a system of “constitutional caste,” whereby different socioeconomic classes have differential access
to constitutional rights. Id. at 1497.
See id. at 1489–90 (“[W]hen a preferred constitutional liberty centrally entails autonomy of choice,
it is problematic to declare that liberty inalienable . . . inalienability theory focuses too generally on
problems with exchange.”).
See SANDEL, supra note 31, at 9 (describing the “corrosive tendency of markets” and claiming
“[p]utting a price on the good things in life can corrupt them); id. at 44 (“[W]e corrupt a good, an
activity, or a social practice whenever we treat it according to a lower norm than is appropriate to
it.”); id. at 111 (“According to this objection, certain moral and civic goods are diminished or
corrupted if bought and sold . . . .”); Sandel, supra note 31, at 95; Cohen, supra note 106, at 73;
Cohen, supra note 31, at 691–92.
Cohen, supra note 106, at 73; Sandel, supra note 31, at 95.
Walzer, supra note 107, at 97–103 (inquiring into the proper sphere of money).
Anderson, supra note 107, at 8, 10 (identifying “use, respect, appreciation, consideration, and love
as five different modes of valuation”).
Cohen, supra note 31, at 692.
See Immanuel Kant, Of Duties to the Body in Regard to the Sexual Impulse, in LECTURES ON ETHICS 155,
157 (Peter Heath & J.B. Schneewind, eds., Peter Heath, trans., 1997) (“Man cannot dispose over
himself, because he is not a thing. He is not his own property . . . he is not entitled to sell a tooth,
or any of his members.”); KANT, supra note 108, at 93 (“What has a price can be replaced by
something else as its equivalent; what on the other hand is above all price and therefore admits of no
equivalent has a dignity.”); see also Andrea Sangiovanni, Why There Cannot be a Truly Kantian Theory of
Human Rights, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF HUMAN RIGHTS 671, 686 (Rowan Cruft, S.
Matthew Liao, & Massimo Renzo eds., 2015) (noting Kant regarded dignity as a property of
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In one way, corruption arguments are stronger than inequality-based
arguments. Corruption arguments derive their force from judgments about
the “the moral importance of the goods at stake” rather than from appeals
to consent.151 Consequently, unlike inequality-based arguments, corruption
objections would persist even if background conditions of inequality and the
concomitant coercive effects of poverty were eliminated.152 The argument
that market valuation degrades the intrinsic value153 of a particular good,
whether an organ or a right, depends on moral judgments rather than on
purity of consent. For this reason, corruption arguments are also inherently
more controversial than inequality-based objections “because they require
inquiry into the [moral] ‘appropriateness’ of an exchange.”154
Anticommodificationists approach the question of whether or not market
valuation is morally appropriate for a particular good from two general
perspectives: Conventionalism and Essentialism. Conventionalism, typified
by philosophers such as Michael Walzer, assesses the moral appropriateness
of market exchanges based on the prevailing social norms of a particular
community at a particular time.155 This approach, however, has many wellknown and obvious pitfalls, including the risk of devolution into moral
relativism and the difficulties of defining the relevant “community.”156
Essentialism, on the other hand, determines moral appropriateness based
on the “essence” of the good in question. Essentialism holds that “there is
something objective and timeless in the good that requires a particular mode

151
152
153

154
155
156

humanity, meaning that humanity has an “unconditional, absolute worth,” and is “above all
price”).
Sandel, supra note 31, at 95.
See id.
As Professor Cohen has noted, corruption arguments usually take this “intrinsic form.” Cohen, The
Price of Everything, at 692. n.13. The intrinsic corruption objection is principled and categorical:
under no circumstances can market valuation be considered appropriate for the good in question.
There is another permutation of the corruption argument, however, that is consequentialist and
contingent: “Consequentialist Corruption justifies intervention to prevent changes to our attitudes
or sensibilities that will occur if the practice is allowed.” See id.; Cohen, supra note 106 at 74. Like
inequality arguments, the consequentialist corruption objection holds only if assuming certain
empirical facts about the world. Cohen, for example, focuses on the consequentialist corruption
argument to baby-selling: “children may find out how much their parents paid for them, this
knowledge may spread in society,” which may in turn corrupt nonmarket values like the parentchild bond. Cohen, The Price of Everything, at 692. n.13. Such consequentialist concerns can be
addressed by consequentialist policy solutions; intrinsic corruption objections, in contrast, are
stronger because they cannot be addressed by consequentialist policy solutions and instead hold
regardless of the empirical state of the world. See id. Intrinsic corruption arguments are therefore
more convincing, and the rest of this paper focuses on intrinsic corruption.
Cohen, The Price of Everything, supra note 31, at 693.
Id. (noting Walzer’s approach to commodification). See generally WALZER, supra note 107, at 95–128
(discussing money and commodities in different markets).
Cohen, The Price of Everything, supra note 31, at 694–95.
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of valuation.”157 As Glenn Cohen has helpfully illustrated, the Essentialist
corruption argument can take two forms: the “Nature of the Goods” and the
“Nature of the Transaction” formulations. The “Nature of the Goods”
formula objects to any exchange where a “higher value” good (perhaps an
organ) is exchanged for a lower value good (such as money)—in other words,
according to this formula, corruption occurs whenever a “higher sphere”
good is exchanged for a “lower sphere” good.158
The scholarly debate on Nature of the Goods Essentialism is best
understood when arrayed on a spectrum. At one pole, commodificationists,
such as Richard Epstein, argue that all goods are commensurable (i.e., there
is only one sphere) and therefore all voluntary transactions are permissible.159
At the other end of the spectrum, is the seemingly insupportable idea that
each individual good has a unique sphere of valuation and that therefore all
transactions are corruption.160 Prominent anticommodificationist thinkers
fall somewhere in between these two poles. Michael Sandel, for example,
distinguishes between market goods on the one hand, which are properly
valued according to profit and use, and civic goods and sacred goods on the
other, which are corrupted by commodification.161 Similarly, the pluralistexpressive theory of value developed by Elizabeth Anderson introduces a
concept of “hierarchical incommensurability” between market goods and
commodities and “paradigmatic higher goods such as human life, friendship,
freedom and human rights.”162 The Nature of the Goods formula of
Essentialism and its hierarchical distinctions between different,
incommensurably valuable goods will be key in applying the
anticommodification framework to unconstitutional conditions questions in
the next section.

157
158
159

160
161

162

Cohen, The Price of Everything, supra note 31, at 693.
Id. at 696; see also text accompanying notes 148 and 149 (discussing higher and lower spheres and
differential modes of valuation).
Cf. Richard A. Epstein, Are Values Incommensurable, or Is Utility the Ruler of the World?, 3 UTAH L. REV.
683, 698 (1995) (“Comparisons across different domains can be and often are made.”); see also
Cohen, The Price of Everything, supra note 31, at 697 (describing the idea that “there are no spheres,
or rather, everything falls within a single sphere, and therefore all exchanges are permissible.”).
See Cohen, The Price of Everything, supra note 31, at 698 (describing unique spheres of valuation).
See SANDEL, supra note 31, at 9–10 (distinguishing between commodities, and cherished goods and
civic duties and rights); id. at 37 (“Turning sacred goods into instruments of profit values them in
the wrong way.”); id. at 203 (“[A]re there certain moral and civic goods that markets do not honor
and money cannot buy?”); Sandel, supra note 31, at 94 (“[C]ertain moral and civic goods are
diminished or corrupted if bought and sold for money.”); see also Cohen, The Price of Everything, at
697 n.29 (identifying Sandel with this three-part division).
Anderson, supra note 107, at 66; see also id. at 70 (“Two goods are incomparable in intrinsic worth
if they are not candidates for the same mode of valuation.”).
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As Cohen rightly points out, however, positions like Sandel’s and
Anderson’s, which object to certain transactions based only on the Nature of
the Good are by themselves unsatisfying: such arguments ultimately devolve
into either intuitionism (failing to explain precisely what makes a particular
exchange objectionable) or implausibility (failing to explain the empirical
reality of considered social judgments about certain exchanges.163)164
Consequently, Cohen develops a second, Essentialist corruption argument:
“The Formula from the Nature of the Transaction.”165 This formulation of
the corruption objection focuses on the expressive nature of the transaction:
transactions where higher-value goods are exchanged for lower value goods
are value-denigrating when the exchange purports to establish a value
equilibrium between the two goods.166 For instance, even if selling one’s
blood or trading it for a commodity is value-denigrating, no corruption
occurs in altruistic blood donation or sanguine gift-exchanges because gift
transactions do not purport to express value-equilibrium.167 Therefore,
when considering the application of corruption objections to
unconstitutional conditions problems, it will be important to consider
potential arguments sounding in both the Nature of the Transaction as well
as the Nature of the Good.168

163

164
165
166
167

168

Cohen provides the following example: “Within the ‘sacred’ category, a my-blood-for-your-blood
exchange is acceptable, whereas a my-child-for-your-child exchange is value-denigrating.” Cohen,
The Price of Everything, supra note 31, at 703.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 705–06.
Cf. id. at 706 (“That gifts do not express value equilibrium between goods of different modes is
something they share in common with ‘compensatory’ damages in a suit for wrongful death and
life insurance—the thing used to compensate is never presumed to substitute for the thing that has
been given up.”).
Of course, the validity of corruption objections generally is in dispute. For skepticism about pluralist
theories of value and a concomitant defense of utilitarian monism, see, for example, Epstein, supra
note 159; Richard A. Epstein, Surrogacy: The Case for Full Contractual Enforcement, 81 VA. L. REV. 2305,
2325–28 (1995) (rejecting commodification arguments against paid surrogacy), 2329–30 (rejecting
arguments based on incommensurability in the same context). For a nuanced argument that
corruption objections may not suffice to justify prohibition of “transplant tourism” (where patients
travel abroad seeking to purchase an organ for transplant), see I. GLENN COHEN, PATIENTS WITH
PASSPORTS: MEDICAL TOURISM, LAW, AND ETHICS 283–86 (2015) (“To be sure, this is not a
complete refutation of this kind of argument for banning transplant tourism. There is more that
might be said both in favor and against this type of argument, but for present purposes, I am content
to leave the matter there with the hope that I have at least shown why I think the corruption
argument is not the surest ground for arguing for a prohibition on transplant tourism.”). Cohen’s
arguments, however, are relatively context-specific and do not necessarily apply to the
unconstitutional conditions questions discussed below in this Article.
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III. UNCONSTITUTIONAL CONDITIONS AS ANTICOMMODIFICATION:
APPLICATION TO CASES
Although the corruption argument against rights-commodification has
been absent from the literature since its dismissal in Kathleen Sullivan’s seminal Article, this Section theorizes that, as a descriptive matter, the corruption
objection helps to explain some of the Court’s recent unconstitutional conditions decisions, especially in the First Amendment context. In addition, in
the realm of constitutional criminal procedure, anticommodification theory
provides a principled means of resolving the apparent “waiver paradox,”
where criminal protections can be waived through plea bargains but certain
noncriminal rights cannot be waived under unconstitutional conditions doctrine.169
The application of anticommodification arguments to unconstitutional
conditions questions would in fact require the imposition of a duty of
nonwaiveability on individual rightsholders. For several reasons discussed
below, this duty-creation is no reason to reject anticommodification
arguments. To the contrary, the exchange of a right, a civic good, for a
lower-sphere, market good, such as a financial benefit from the government,
should be presumptively impermissible.170 To allow such exchanges would
be value-denigrating, as it would corrupt the moral worth of constitutional
rights as civic goods, which citizens must possess in order to engage in
independent democratic deliberation.
To highlight the relevance of the corruption objection to rightscommodification is not, however, to argue that this concept represents a
“grand unified theory” of unconstitutional conditions.171 To the contrary,
anticoercion can still have an important place in justifying unconstitutional
conditions doctrine, and as NFIB v. Sebelius demonstrates, anticoercion is
perhaps the primary animating principle underlying the Court’s Federalism

169
170

171

See Jason Mazzone, The Waiver Paradox, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 801, 802 (2003).
See Peter Westen, The Rueful Rhetoric of “Rights,” 33 UCLA L. REV. 977, 979–80 (1986)
(distinguishing between strong version of unconstitutional conditions doctrine, which is “an
absolute prohibition, a rule that a state may never condition state-granted privileges on a person’s
not doing something he has a constitutional right to do” and a weaker version, which is a
“presumptive prohibition, a rule that a state may not condition state-granted privileges on a
person’s not doing something he has a constitutional right to do, unless the state presents compelling
state interests in support of its doing so”).
See Ilan Wurman, Note, Drug Testing Welfare Recipients as a Constitutional Condition, 65 STAN. L. REV.
1153, 1178 (2013) (“Most commentators agree that the doctrine as applied by the Supreme Court
defies any grand unified theory of unconstitutional conditions.”).
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decisions.172 Anticoercion is needed to protect against government attempts
to force waiver of rights (or to alter structural distributions of power, like
Federalism) where the exchange does not implicate a value-denigrating
exchange. (United States v. Jackson, discussed below, is perhaps the paradigm
example of a non-value-denigrating, but coercive, waiver of rights.)173
Combining these two normative theories, anticoercion and anticorruption,
this paper argues that the absence of government coercion may be necessary
but is not sufficient to sustain the constitutionality of a conditioned benefit.
A. Anticommodification Impulses in Free Speech Cases
Anticommodification objections, particularly the corruption prong, may
help to explain the Court’s approach in some relatively recent
unconstitutional conditions questions in the Free Speech context. Consider
the landmark case of AID v. Alliance for Open Society International, Inc.,174 in which
the Court held that the government violated the First Amendment by
conditioning the receipt of federal funds on U.S-based international aid
organizations’ express avowal of an anti-prostitution policy.175 In 2003, the
United States Leadership Against HIV/AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria
Act (“Leadership Act”) authorized $15 billion dollars over five years to fund
the work of nongovernmental organizations (“NGOs”) with experience
combating the AIDS epidemic worldwide.176 The NGOs’ receipt of these
funds was conditioned on compliance with two requirements. First, no
Leadership Act funds were to “be used to promote or advocate the
legalization or practice of prostitution or sex trafficking.”177 Second, funds
from the Act could not “provide assistance to any group or organization that
does not have a policy explicitly opposing prostitution and sex trafficking,
except . . . to the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria, the
World Health Organization, the International AIDS Vaccine Initiative or to
any United Nations agency.” (The Court referred to this second requirement

172

173
174
175
176

177

See, e.g., United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570 (1968) (striking down law that unconstitutionally
coerced waiver of jury trial right); sources cited supra note 96; see also supra Section II.A (discussing
consent-based inequality objections to commodification).
390 U.S. 570 (1968).
570 U.S. 205 (2013).
Id. at 221. See generally TRIBE & MATZ, supra note 10, at 259–64 (describing AID as a “landmark
opinion”).
AID, 570 U.S. at 210 (“Since 2003, Congress has authorized the appropriation of billions of dollars
for funding these organizations’ fight against HIV/AIDS around the world.”); TRIBE & MATZ,
supra note 10, at 259. In 2008, the Act was expanded to authorize $48 billion over the next five
years. Id.
AID, 570 U.S. at 210 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting 22 U.S.C. § 7631(e) (2012)).
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as the “Policy Requirement.”)178 A group of domestic NGOs involved in
fighting HIV/AIDS abroad who received Leadership Act funds challenged
the Policy Requirement condition as a First Amendment violation.179 In an
opinion by Chief Justice Roberts, the Court struck down the Policy
Requirement as an unconstitutional condition on the NGOs’ exercise of their
free speech rights.180
For present purposes, the AID decision highlights the potential
explanatory power of the anticommodification corruption objection in
clarifying how the Court actually deals with unconstitutional conditions
questions in the First Amendment context. Because other candidate theories,
namely the so-called “scope of the program” test and the anticoercion test,
for explaining the AID decision are respectively indeterminate or
inapplicable, I argue that the corruption objection to rights-commodification
provides an alternative basis upon which to interpret and understand the
Court’s decision.
The Court in AID purports to apply a “scope of the program” test, which
it derives from prior precedents:181 namely, Regan v. Taxation With
Representation of Washington (“TWR”),182 FCC v. League of Women Voters of
California (“LWV”),183 and Rust v. Sullivan.184 According to the AID majority,
the key distinction in these conditional funding cases is “between conditions
that define the limits of the government spending program—those that
specify the activities Congress wants to subsidize—and conditions that seek
to leverage funding to regulate speech outside the contours of the program
itself.”185 Yet upon closer examination, this test alone is unsatisfying as
theoretic justification for the result in AID.186
First, it is worth noting, as Lloyd Hitoshi Mayer has argued, that this
“scope of the program” test represents a subtle reformulation of the test
previously articulated by these three precedents, which instead focused on
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Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting § 7631(f)).
Id. at 211.
Id. at 221.
Id. at 214–217.
461 U.S. 540 (1983) (upholding requirement that 501(c)(3) nonprofits do not engage in legislative
lobbying).
468 U.S. 364 (1984) (striking down condition on federal funds received by noncommercial television
and radio broadcasters, which required recipients to refrain from editorializing (including with
private funds)).
500 U.S. 173 (1991) (upholding condition on recipients of funds under Title X of the Public Health
Service Act, which prohibited recipients of Title X projects from engaging in abortion counseling,
referral, and activities advocating abortion as a method of family planning).
AID, 570 U.S. at 214–15.
Id. at 217–18.
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whether the government was funding the speech;187 the AID Court instead
shifted the inquiry to focus on whether the government was funding the
program.188 Therefore, the majority’s attestations that prior precedent
dictated its result in AID ring hollow.189
Secondly, and perhaps more importantly, the “scope of the program” test
appears wholly indeterminate.190 The AID majority itself explicitly
acknowledged several times the indeterminacy inherent in applying its
“scope of the program” test.191 In fact, the application of the “scope of the
program” inquiry in AID itself demonstrates its manipulability and thus its
failure to provide a principled, theoretic justification for the result in this case.
The majority was “confident that the Policy Requirement falls on the
unconstitutional side of the line” separating “conditions that define the
federal program and those that reach outside it.”192
It is not immediately apparent from the Chief Justice’s opinion what the
Court understands the limits of the program to be, but at the very least, the
Court believed “the Policy Requirement goes beyond defining the limits of
the federally funded program to defining the recipient” simply because it
“requir[es] recipients to profess a specific belief.”193 The Court defined the
“program” broadly, encompassing a general effort to combat AIDS
internationally.194 In contrast Justice Scalia, writing in dissent, put forth a
187

188
189
190
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See Mayer, supra note 101, at 1069–70 (describing how under the government-speech approach
applied in Rust, TWR, and LWV, “such restrictions on the use of private funds might be justified if
the recipient of the government funding was clearly identified as speaking on behalf of the government
and a failure to maintain this level of separation would undermine or confuse that government
speech” (emphasis added)).
See id. at 1070, 1075 (describing how AID court reformulated the test to focus on the scope of the
program rather than whether or not the government was “speaking”).
See id. at 1076 (claiming “the majority is . . . guilty of selective ignorance with respect to the relevant
precedents.”).
See, e.g., Renée Lettow Lerner, Unconstitutional Conditions, Germaneness, and Institutional Review Boards,
101 NW. U. L. REV. 775, 782 (2007) (“Difficulties in determining government purpose have come
up in unconstitutional conditions cases. Courts may, of course, define purposes broadly or
narrowly.”); Sullivan, supra note 21, at 1474 (“[G]ermaneness theories founder on the extreme
malleability of the concept of germaneness itself. Germaneness to the purpose of a benefit depends
crucially on how broadly or narrowly that purpose is defined.”); id. at 1476 (explaining theories
based on germaneness to government purpose are underinclusive because “they fail to explain
why germane burdens on constitutional rights should be regarded as benign”).
AID v. Alliance for Open Society Intern., Inc., 570 U.S. 205, 215 (2013) (“The line is hardly clear, in part
because the definition of a particular program can always be manipulated to subsume the
challenged condition.”); id. at 217 (“[T]he distinction drawn in these cases—between conditions
that define the federal program and those that reach outside it—is not always self-evident.”).
Id.
Id. at 218.
Cf. Lerner, supra note 190, at 783 (explaining that the danger, from a civil libertarian perspective,
in unconstitutional conditions cases implicating free speech is that courts will interpret the
government’s purpose too narrowly, allowing the government to pursue a broader ideological
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more specific understanding of the scope of the program: “Elimination of
prostitution is an objective of the HIV/AIDS program, and any promotion
of prostitution—whether made inside or outside the program—does harm the
program.”195 From this perspective, the Policy Requirement fit within the
scope of the program because admission of an “ideological opponent” (i.e.
anyone unwilling to sign on to the Policy Requirement) would “frustrate the
purpose of the program” by, among other things, allowing the opponent to
use its private funds in pursuit of ideologically opposed advocacy.196 While
perhaps it is possible for courts to divine an objective programmatic
government purpose, it is certainly a difficult task197; either way, in the AID
case, it does not provide a clear, principled explanation of the result.
Not only does the “scope of the program” test fail to explain AID, but
also, as the dissent forcefully argues and as the majority implicitly
concedes,198 the anticoercion rationale at play in other unconstitutional
conditions cases was simply inapplicable in AID.199 In Justice Scalia’s words,
“the contention that the condition here ‘coerces’ respondents’ speech is on
its face implausible. Those organizations that wish to take a different tack
with respect to prostitution ‘are as unconstrained now as they were before
the enactment of [the Leadership Act].’”200 Consequently, we must look
elsewhere for an explanation of the majority’s result.
My hypothesis is that the decision in AID can be explained, at least
partially, by resort to the corruption objections to commodification, as
described in Section II. Stripped of the cover provided by the inherently
malleable “scope of the program test,” and immune from any concerns about
coercion, the condition at issue in AID is revealed to be a naked attempt by

195
196
197

198

199
200

agenda while pretending its purpose is just to control government expenditures within a particular
program).
AID, 570 U.S. at 224 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Id.
See, e.g., Lerner, supra note 190, at 784–85 (noting difficulty in discerning the purpose of government
programs, which would require “digging deep” in legislative history of laws to “discover their true
purposes,” but ultimately arguing such difficulty can be overcome in applying a germaneness-topurpose test).
AID, 570 U.S. at 226 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“The majority cannot credibly say that this speech
condition is coercive, so it does not.”); see also TRIBE & MATZ, supra note 10, at 261 (“Scalia was
almost certainly right about the absence of direct coercion: the Act created a new funding source,
one upon which no organizations were already dependent and that they were free to reject.”).
See, e.g., NFIB v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 580–81 (2012) (discussing whether aspects of Congress’s
financial inducement in the Affordable Care Act are overly coercive).
AID, 570 U.S. at 225 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting Nat’l Endowment for Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S.
569, 595 (1998) (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment)); see also Mayer, supra note 101, at 1076
(agreeing that coercion is absent).
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the government to purchase the constitutional rights of the recipients to speak
freely on the subject of prostitution.201
When AID is reframed in this way, the relevance of anticommodification
concerns to this case becomes clear. Recall the two formulations of the
essentialist corruption objection, developed above: (1) The Nature of the
Goods Formulation; and (2) The Nature of the Transaction Formulation.
Under the Nature of the Goods Formulation, a transaction should be barred
if it involves the exchange of a higher sphere good (in this case, a
constitutional right) for a lower sphere good (money).202 From the Nature of
the Goods perspective, there are at least two arguments that the free speech
rights and financial benefits at issue in AID are incommensurable.
First, in terms of the Kantian dichotomy between persons, which are
valued and respected according to their dignity, and things, which are valued
according to their use,203 there is an argument that fundamental rights, such
as the free speech right in AID, are too closely tied to human dignity to be
exchanged for money. To engage in such an exchange would denigrate the
value of the right, treating it as a thing to be used rather than as an aspect of
dignity to be respected.204 The Kantian case for anticommodification is
perhaps particularly strong in the First Amendment context, where the Court
and scholars alike have closely linked the right of free expression with
individual human dignity.205
201
202
203
204

205

See Mayer, supra note 101, at 1077 (characterizing the condition in AID as a purchase).
See supra notes 157–58158 and accompanying text.
See supra note 108 and accompanying text.
Cf. id.; MARGARET JANE RADIN, CONTESTED COMMODITIES 84 (1996) (“[T]he Kantian person
cannot be conceived of as a fungible exchangeable object . . . [I]f we do not want to lose hold of
Kantian personhood, we might think that market rhetoric should be culturally discouraged in cases
in which market conceptualization harms personhood.”).
See, e.g., Erin Daly, Human Dignity in the Roberts Court: A Story of Inchoate Institutions, Autonomous Individuals,
and the Reluctant Recognition of a Right, 37 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 381, 412 (2011) (“Since the earliest days
of its First Amendment jurisprudence, the Court has recognized that freedom of speech enhances
dignity in both its identity and conscience dimensions,” even though dignity interests in free speech
are less well-developed and less explicit in American than in European free speech jurisprudence.);
Leslie Meltzer Henry, The Jurisprudence of Dignity, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 169, 173 n.18 (2011) (collecting
First Amendment free speech cases where Court has invoked individual dignity as theoretic basis
of the right). It is not inconsistent to hold that rights cannot be commodified because they are too
closely associated with individual dignity, even though the decision to bar the exchange of rights
for money itself impinges upon individual decisional autonomy. Cf. Sullivan, supra note 21, at 1446;
William T. Mayton, “Buying-Up Speech: Active Government and the Terms of the First and Fourteenth
Amendments, 3 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 373, 380 (1994) (arguing that “a right is customarily
justified by principles of personal autonomy and dignity” and “[a]n implication of this autonomy
in rights is that they are alienable”). To the contrary, “many scholars,” including libertarians like
Randy Barnett and Richard Epstein, “concur that agreements alienating certain liberties should
not be enforceable by the State.” Donald J. Smythe, Liberty at the Borders of Private Law, 49 AKRON
L. REV. 1, 32–33 & n.152 (2016) (citing RANDY E. BARNETT, THE STRUCTURE OF LIBERTY:
JUSTICE AND THE RULE OF LAW (1998); Richard A. Epstein, Notice and Freedom of Contract in the
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Second, one might object to the commodification of free speech rights
not as an affront to individual dignity but rather as a civic corruption. Under
this framework, which draws on civic-republican political theory,206
fundamental rights are “civic goods,” which are “diminished or corrupted if
bought and sold for money.”207 The right to vote, perhaps the quintessential
civic good, cannot be purchased because to allow such an exchange would
fundamentally denigrate the nature of the vote.208 Similarly, under this civic
Law of Servitudes, 55 S. CAL. L. REV. 1353, 1368 (1981). For example, it is obvious that

206

207
208

“voluntary slavery” as well as other forms of agreement to “bonded labor,” are impermissible and
unenforceable, regardless of whether an individual autonomously decides to enter into such an
exchange of fundamental liberty for money. See Debra Satz, Voluntary Slavery and the Limits of the
Market, 3 LAW & ETHICS HUM. RTS. 86, 87–89 (2009) (noting the existence of voluntary slavery in
history and explaining that U.S. law makes “voluntary slavery contracts, debt slavery, specific
performance as a remedy for breach, or contracts that are considered ‘unconscionable’”
unenforceable, despite the inability of libertarianism or Paretian welfare economics to theoretically
justify this unenforceability). One does not need to equate the right to free speech to the right
against enslavement to accept the Kantian argument against rights commodification. The
argument simply requires acceptance of the premise that free speech and expression are similarly
so closely associated with individual dignity as bar the exchange of the right for money. Cf. KANT,
supra note 150, at 157 (“Man cannot dispose over himself, because he is not a thing. He is not his
own property . . . he is not entitled to sell a tooth, or any of his members.”); LARA DENIS, MORAL
SELF-REGARD: DUTIES TO ONESELF IN KANT’S MORAL THEORY 103 (2013) (describing
impermissibility of prostitution under Kant’s moral theory).
Civic republican political theory understands freedom to mean shared participation in selfgovernment through deliberation with fellow citizens about the common good. See MICHAEL J.
SANDEL, DEMOCRACY’S DISCONTENT: AMERICA IN SEARCH OF A PUBLIC PHILOSOPHY 5 (1996);
Richard H. Fallon, Jr., What Is Republicanism, and Is It Worth Reviving?, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1695,
1697 (1989) (identifying the following core tenets of republicanism: “human beings are essentially
political animals, . . . they can fulfill their natures only by participating in self-government, and . .
. the most important aims of the political community should be to promote virtue among the
citizenry and to advance the common good”); Frank I. Michelman, The Supreme Court, 1985 Term—
Foreword, Traces of Self-Government, 100 HARV. L. REV. 4, 18 (1986) (listing the following republican
themes: “common good, civic virtue, participation, independence, corruption, and balance”); Cass
R. Sunstein, Beyond the Republican Revival, 97 YALE L.J. 1539, 1541 (1988) (identifying four core
republican principles: (1) deliberation in politics; (2) “equality of political actors”; (3) the
universalistic notion of the “common good,” realized through exercise of “practical reason”; and
(4) “citizenship, manifesting itself in broadly guaranteed rights of participation”); see also LOUIS
MICHAEL SEIDMAN, ON CONSTITUTIONAL DISOBEDIENCE 99–102 (2012) (discussing distinction
between liberal and republican conceptions of freedom).
Civic republicanism rejects neutrality among differing visions of the good life, requiring
instead a “formative politics,” which cultivates in its citizens certain civic virtues needed for true
self-government. SANDEL, supra, at 5–6. Civic virtue and the common good are closely entwined
concepts: republican political thought understands civic virtue to mean “the willingness of citizens
to subordinate their private interests to the general good.” Michelman, supra, at 18 (citing
GEOFFREY R. STONE ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (1st ed., 1986)).
Cf. Sandel, supra note 31, at 94; Cohen, The Price of Everything, supra note 31, at 697 (describing
Sandel’s “tripartite division between market goods, civic goods, and sacred goods”).
See Sandel, supra note 31, at 118 (“Our reluctance to treat votes as commodities should lead us to
question the politics of self-interest so familiar in our time. It should also lead us to acknowledge
and affirm the republican ideals implicit but occluded in contemporary democratic practice.”); see
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republican conception, rights, perhaps especially free speech rights, might be
considered civic goods that simply should not be the subject of market
transactions. 209 This argument is related to but distinct from both arguments
like Professor Merrill’s, that rights with a large “public goods” dimension
should be not be individually waiveable,210 and from arguments like
Professor Tribe’s against individual waiver of relational rights, which protect
against structural subordination.211 The public goods and/or relational
nature of rights like free speech are features of the right, which identify it as
a civic good. Yet the objection to the right’s commodification, on this view,
is not contingent on whether the right “produces external benefits.”212
Instead, the civic republican objection is principled and holds irrespective of
consequentialist claims about positive externalities. The civic value of certain
rights, such as the free speech right,213 are incommensurable with market

209

210
211
212
213

also Smythe, supra note 205, at 32–33 (implying strongly that we would reject the idea that courts
should “enforce an agreement under which one individual or group of individuals paid another
individual or group of individuals not to vote”); Pamela S. Karlan, Not by Money but by Virtue Won?
Vote Trafficking and the Voting Rights System, 80 VA. L. REV. 1455, 1458 (1994) (“In contrast to the
unambiguously autonomy-expanding character of anti-intimidation laws, anti-[vote-]trafficking
measures actually restrict a voter’s options. They treat voting as a “market-inalienable” activity so
that votes cannot be bought or sold, but can only be cast or lost on election day.”).
Cf. Hamburger, supra note 15, at 539 (“Personal rights are matters in which there is a profound
public interest. Indeed, they are matters in which the people have declared their interest. They
therefore cannot be left to private individuals or institutions.”); Mayton, supra note 205, at 376–77
(“[T]he First Amendment is not just about a personal right to speak. Instead, what the amendment
primarily does is to establish free speech as a common good.”); Westermann, supra note 41, at 6 n.12
(“Sales of rights such as speech rights and voting rights by individual citizens would also produce
adverse effects on the overall citizenry.”).
See infra notes 293–294 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 295–298 and accompanying text.
Cf. Thomas W. Merrill, Dolan v. City of Tigard: Constitutional Rights as Public Goods, 72 DENV. U. L.
REV. 859, 870 (1995).
See, e.g., Bd. of Airport Comm’rs of City of L.A. v. Jews for Jesus, Inc., 482 U.S. 569, 574 (1987)
(“[A]n individual whose own speech or conduct may be prohibited is permitted to challenge a
statute on its face because it also threatens others not before the court-those who desire to engage
in legally protected expression but who may refrain from doing so rather than risk prosecution or
undertake to have the law declared partially invalid.”); Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375
(1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring) (“Those who won our independence believed that the final end of
the state was to make men free to develop their faculties, and that in its government the deliberative
forces should prevail over the arbitrary . . . . They believed that freedom to think as you will and to
speak as you think are means indispensable to the discovery and spread of political truth; that
without free speech and assembly discussion would be futile; that with them, discussion affords
ordinarily adequate protection against the dissemination of noxious doctrine; that the greatest
menace to freedom is an inert people; that public discussion is a political duty; and that this should
be a fundamental principle of the American government.”); see also Kristen M. Formanek, There’s
“No Such Thing As Too Much Speech”: How Advertising Deregulation and the Marketplace of Ideas Can Protect
Democracy in America, 94 IOWA L. REV. 1743, 1754 (2009) (“Several English and American
philosophers have discussed the concepts behind the First Amendment, which encompass both
political-integrity ideals and an interest in American democracy. These concepts include:
(1) Marketplace of Ideas—enabling the search for truth; (2) Safety Valve—giving citizens a chance
to be heard rather than expressing political tension in destructive ways; (3) Self-Actualization—
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values and thus to treat such rights as commodities would be to impermissibly
denigrate their value.
If one accepts either the Kantian or civic republican Nature of the Goods
argument against the commodification of free speech rights in cases like AID,
then it becomes clear that the condition in AID is also problematic due to the
Nature of the Transaction. Recall that this formulation of the corruption
argument objects to transactions where higher-value goods are exchanged
for lower-value goods when the exchange purports to establish a value
equilibrium between the two incommensurable goods.214 The Nature of the
Transaction formulation thus focuses the inquiry on the expressive nature of
the transaction. The condition in AID is problematic precisely because it
amounted to an effort by the government to purchase the organization's
rights in exchange for financial benefit.215 Because a purchase is by definition
an expression of “value equilibrium” between goods and money, and given
that the free speech right is a higher value good,216 the potential exchange of
rights for money in AID is impermissibly value-denigrating.217

214
215

216

217

empowering people through expression; (4) Self-Governing Citizenry—creating an informed
public; and (5) Checking Value —monitoring corporations, government, and other institutions.”).
See supra note 166 and accompanying text.
Cf. TRIBE & MATZ, supra note 10, at 255 (“There’s something terribly wrong with the government
breaking out its huge checkbook and buying the ability to violate our rights.”); Hamburger, supra
note 15, at 540 (“If the government can make a side deal to purchase its way out from under
constitutional limitations, the Constitution cannot consistently limit government in its relation to
the people, and the people cannot consistently rely on the law and the courts to hold the
government accountable to them.”); Mayer, supra note 101, at 1049 (discussing AID and arguing
generally that “the government is not permitted to buy an organization’s speech absent a
compelling governmental interest in doing so and then only if the purchase is done in a manner
that is narrowly tailored to serve that interest”); Westermann, supra note 41, at 6 n.12 (“[F]or the
state to engage in wholesale purchases of fundamental constitutional rights would be a
circumvention of the Constitution’s supermajority amendment requirement. Sales of rights such as
speech rights and voting rights by individual citizens would also produce adverse effects on the
overall citizenry.”).
From the Nature of the Transaction perspective, the case might be different, however, if the
government offers a private party access to a particular forum for speech on the condition that a
party adopt “a policy explicitly opposing prostitution and sex trafficking, except . . . to the Global
Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria, the World Health Organization, the International
AIDS Vaccine Initiative or to any United Nations agency.” Cf. AID v. Alliance for Open Society Intern.,
Inc., 570 U.S. 205, 210 (2013).
As one commentator has already noted, the AID decision makes the Trump Administration’s
reinstatement and expansion of the so-called “Global Gag Rule” constitutionally suspect as a
doctrinal matter. See Stern, supra note 12. The “Global Gag Rule” is a policy that “prohibits all
recipients of international family planning funds from providing abortion-related care, referring
patients to abortion providers, or giving women information about abortions.” Id. For virtually
the same reasons outlined in this Section with respect to the unconstitutional policy in AID, this
policy also represents a morally problematic attempt to commodify free speech rights.

May 2019]

CONTRACTING AROUND THE CONSTITUTION

1201

B. Anticommodification and Constitutional Criminal Law: Addressing the Waiver
Paradox
An understanding of the relationship between the corruption objection
to rights-commodification and unconstitutional conditions questions also
yields new insights into what Jason Mazzone has described as the “waiver
paradox”:
There is a paradox in constitutional law, revealed by a simple question: Can
individuals give up constitutional rights in exchange for a benefit from the
government? The answer is that it depends; but it depends in a quite accidental way. Two different doctrines govern whether a constitutional right
may be waived . . . the Supreme Court has recognized that criminal defendants may waive various constitutional protections, including the Fourth
Amendment right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures, the
Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination, and the Sixth Amendment rights to a jury trial, to confrontation of witnesses, and to the assistance
of counsel. Indeed, these criminal protections are routinely bargained away
in exchange for reduced sentences, dismissal of additional charges, or other
benefits, when defendants plead guilty pursuant to plea agreements. On the
other hand, under the doctrine the Court calls the unconstitutional conditions doctrine, the Court has held that other provisions of the Constitution,
particularly First Amendment rights, may not generally be waived, even if
the government provides a substantial benefit in return. 218

Application of the corruption objection to rights-commodification may
help to resolve the waiver paradox: despite other problematic implications of
the current plea bargain system,219 an anticommodificationist understanding
of unconstitutional conditions allows us to reconcile our acceptance of noncoercive waivers of rights in the plea bargain context with our rejection with
rejection of effective purchases of fundamental rights under the
unconstitutional conditions doctrine.
The touchstone of the Court’s current constitutional doctrine on pleabargaining is anticoercion. As the Court noted in Boykin v. Alabama, “[s]everal
federal constitutional rights are involved in a waiver that takes place when a
plea of guilty is entered in a state criminal trial,” including the privilege
218
219

See Mazzone, supra note 169, at 801.
See, e.g., Lafler v. Cooper, 566 U.S. 156, 185 (2012) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“In the United States, we
have plea bargaining a-plenty, but until today it has been regarded as a necessary evil. It presents
grave risks of prosecutorial overcharging that effectively compels an innocent defendant to avoid
massive risk by pleading guilty to a lesser offense; and for guilty defendants it often—perhaps
usually—results in a sentence well below what the law prescribes for the actual crime. But even so,
we accept plea bargaining because many believe that without it our long and expensive process of
criminal trial could not sustain the burden imposed on it, and our system of criminal justice would
grind to a halt.”); TRIBE & MATZ, supra note 10, at 269 (“Over 95 percent of criminal cases now
end with plea bargains, meaning that one of our most treasured constitutional rights—the right to
a jury trial—plays only a bit part in today’s criminal law.”).
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against compelled self-incrimination, the right to trial by jury, and the right
to confront one’s accusers.220 When a defendant pleads guilty, the Court will
apply the same voluntariness standard as it applies in assessing the
admissibility of defendant confessions, which must be “intelligent and
voluntary.”221
As the Boykin Court cautioned, “[i]gnorance,
incomprehension, coercion, terror, inducements, subtle or blatant threats
might be a perfect cover-up of unconstitutionality” when the waiver of
constitutional rights is at issue.222
At the same time, it is important to keep in mind that the Court’s
assessment of whether or not coercion was present is, at bottom, an
unavoidably and “inherently normative inquiry.”223 For example, in
Bordenkircher v. Hayes, the Court held that the Due Process Clause is not
violated when the prosecutor “carries out a threat made during plea
negotiations to reindict the accused on more serious charges if he does not
plead guilty.”224 The Court reasoned that even though, “confronting a
defendant with the risk of more severe punishment clearly may have a
discouraging effect on the defendant’s assertion of his trial rights, the
imposition of these difficult choices [is] an inevitable—and permissible—
attribute of any legitimate system which tolerates and encourages the
negotiation of pleas.”225 There is nothing inherently unconstitutional in the
fact that “the prosecutor’s interest at the bargaining table is to persuade the
defendant to forgo his right to plead not guilty.”226 The absence of coercion
is the limiting principle,227 but given the inherently normative nature of the
coercion inquiry, how does the Court distinguish between permissible
threats, as in Bordenkircher, and impermissible coercion, as in a case like United
States v. Jackson, which held that the “death penalty provision of the Federal
Kidnapping Act imposes an impermissible burden upon the exercise” of the
Fifth Amendment right not to plead guilty and the Sixth Amendment right
to a jury trial?228

220
221
222
223
224
225
226
227
228

395 U.S. 238, 243 (1969).
Id. at 242.
Id. at 242–43.
Cf. Cohen, supra note 106, at 107 (“Of course, what kind of proposals one does or does not have
the right to make is itself an inherently normative inquiry.”).
Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 358, 365 (1978).
Id. at 364 (citing Chaffin v. Stynchcombe, 412 U.S. 17, 31 (1973)).
Id. (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).
See id. at 363.
United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570, 572 (1968); see also Bordenkircher, 434 U.S. at 363 (citing
Jackson in support of idea that it is unconstitutional “for an agent of the State to pursue a course of
action whose objective is to penalize a person’s reliance on his legal rights”).
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Anticommodification principles cast some explanatory light on this
question, although anticommodification alone is insufficient to dissipate the
shadow of confusion surrounding the Court’s approach to coercive pleabargaining and the problem of the waiver paradox generally. When
reconceptualized with a focus on corruption concerns about rightscommodification, the plea-bargaining system is significantly different from
the unconstitutional condition in AID: whereas the offer in AID, if accepted,
would have essentially amounted to a rights-commodifying exchange of
rights for money, plea bargains involve a non-commodifying exchange of
some rights (the Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination and the
Sixth Amendment jury-trial right) for another right (“the most elemental of
liberty interests”229—freedom from imprisonment by one’s government).230
From this perspective, the absence of coercion (despite the intuitionist nature
of the inquiry) is a necessary but not sufficient condition for constitutional
plea-bargaining.
A comparison of Lefkowitz v. Turley231 and Lefkowtiz v. Cunningham232—both
of which invalidated New York statutes that burdened the defendants’ right
against compelled self-incrimination—with Bordenkircher illuminates the
argument: even though all of these cases invoke the anticoercion paradigm,
the Court’s approach draws an implicit line between impermissible rightscommodification and permissible rights-substitution in the realm of
constitutional criminal law. The waiver paradox thus appears less
paradoxical: corruption concerns about commodification, which, I argue,
partially animate and justify the unconstitutional conditions doctrine, simply
do not apply in the context of plea bargains. Thus, the Court is implicitly
more willing to accept plea bargains as a constitutional exercise of
governmental power.
Lefkowitz v. Turley provides the clearest example of the Court’s latent
corruption concerns about the commodification of criminal procedures
rights, even though the Court’s analysis is framed in anticoercion terms.233
In Turley, the Court confronted a New York statute that required cancellation
229
230

231
232
233

Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 529 (2004) (O’Connor, J., plurality opinion).
Cf. TRIBE & MATZ, supra note 10, at 270 (arguing that Justice Kennedy’s opinion in Lafler conceived
of plea-bargaining “as a substitution of one type of right (a fair plea-bargaining process) for another
(a fair trial)”); Westermann, supra note 41, at 6 (“[F]or a citizen faced with criminal prosecution,
exchanging future uncertain determination of her prosecution via her Sixth Amendment jury trial
right for certain determination on terms acceptable to the citizen pursuant to a plea bargain
constitutes an exchange of the jury trial right for what, in her view, is a superior direct substitute
for such right.”).
414 U.S. 70 (1973).
431 U.S. 801 (1977).
See Lefkowitz v. Turley, 414 U.S. 70, 82–83 (1973) (“A waiver secured under threat of substantial
economic sanction cannot be termed voluntary.”).
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of existing public contracts and disqualification from transacting with the
state for five years “if a contractor refuses to waive immunity or to answer
questions when called to testify concerning his contracts with the State or any
of its subdivisions.”234 In an opinion by Justice White, the Court invalidated
the statute, reasoning that “[a] waiver secured under threat of substantial
economic sanction cannot be termed voluntary.”235 In response to the
State’s argument that this economic penalty did not amount to coercion,
Justice White described the magnitude of the economic harm a private
contractor (an architect, in this case) would face if banned from contracting
with the State, even though private sector work would remain available.236
Although this response sounds in anticoercion principles, it is hard to find a
principled reason that the threat of economic sanctions would be coercive
whereas the threat of reindictment on more serious charges in Bordenkircher
would not.237
Four years after Turley, the Court applied similar logic to strike down
another New York statute in Lefkowitz v. Cunningham. The statute at issue in
Cunningham provided that, if a political party officer refuses to answer a
question under grand jury subpoena or to testify about his conduct in office,
then his position will be terminated and he will be “prohibit[ed] from holding
any other party or public office for a period of five years.”238 The Cunningham
Court reaffirmed the principle from Turley and other earlier cases that it is
unconstitutional to impose “penalties having a substantial economic impact”
when an individual refuses to waive the Fifth Amendment right against selfincrimination.239 In this case too, the Court found that several negative
“economic consequences” followed from refusal to waive under New York’s
statute, and therefore, these penalties “constitute[d] economic coercion.”240
Although the Court offered additional, alternative reasons why the statute
constituted coercion, including damage to the officer’s prestige and
reputation241 and the burden on his First Amendment right “to participate in
234
235
236
237
238
239

240
241

Id. at 71.
Id. at 82–83.
See id. at 83–84 (stating that “an architect lives off his contracting fees as surely as a state employee
lives off his salary”).
Cf. Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 358, 365 (1978).
Cunningham, 431 U.S. at 802–03.
Id. at 806; see also McKune v. Lile, 536 U.S. 24, 27–28 (2002) (reaffirming the continuing vitality of
the “penalty cases,” which “establish that the potential loss of one’s livelihood through, e.g., the loss
of employment, Uniformed Sanitation Men Ass’n, Inc. v. Commissioner of Sanitation of City of New York, 392
U.S. 280 (1968), and the loss of the right to participate in political associations and to hold public
office, Lefkowitz v. Cunningham, 431 U.S. 801 (1977) are capable of coercing incriminating
testimony”).
Cunningham, 431 U.S. at 807.
Id.
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private, voluntary political associations,”242 it seems “economic coercion”
alone remains sufficient to invalidate conditions on the exercise of an
individual’s Fifth Amendment privilege.
With Turley and Lefkowitz in mind, the question remains: how can we
reconcile the fact that an economic penalty on an individual’s refusal to waive
their Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination is impermissibly
coercive with the idea that “a threat made during plea negotiations to
reindict the accused on more serious charges if he does not plead guilty”243
does not amount to coercion? I am not alone in questioning the claim that
coercion is absent in the latter situation, despite its constitutional validation
in Bordenkircher.244 Given the inherent manipulability of the coercion

242

243
244

Id. at 808. In Cunningham, the Court found the law “coercive for yet another reason” in addition to
economic coercion: “It requires appellee to forfeit one constitutionally protected right as the price
for exercising another.” Id. at 807–08. This language is admittedly in some tension with the
argument here, that plea-bargaining is permissible because it involves the exchange of rights for
other rights and is therefore not value-denigrating. Yet because Cunningham frames this as an
alternative to the economic coercion argument based on the Turley line of precedent, it does not
undercut the idea that the Court is implicitly motivated by a desire to prevent the commodification
of rights. Moreover, Cunningham derives the principle that one cannot be made to forfeit a
constitutional right as the price for exercising another from Simmons v. United States, which held that
“when a defendant testifies in support of a motion to suppress evidence on Fourth Amendment
grounds, his testimony may not thereafter be admitted against him at trial on the issue of guilt unless
he makes no objection.” 390 U.S. 377, 394 (1968). Yet this case is not really about a bargain where
one right is traded for another. In Simmons, the defendant could not have waived his Fourth
Amendment right, which had already been allegedly violated by an unreasonable seizure. United
States v. Garrett, 371 F.2d 296, 297–98 (7th Cir. 1966), aff’d in part, rev’d in part sub nom. Simmons
v. United States, 390 U.S. 377 (1968) (describing the alleged Fourth Amendment violation). The
purported violation had already occurred by the time of the suppression motion; defendant was
only pressured to waive a particular remedy (the exclusionary rule) in exchange for exercise of the
Fifth Amendment privilege. Cf. Richard H. Fallon & Daniel J. Meltzer, New Law, Non-Retroactivity,
and Constitutional Remedies, 104 HARV. L. REV. 1731, 1774 (1991) (“[T]he fourth amendment, in its
substantive dimension, prohibits unconstitutional searches, not the admission of unconstitutionally
seized evidence at trial. Because any violation of the Constitution occurred in the past, outside of
court, admission of the evidence is not an independent violation. On this understanding of the
exclusionary rule, whether evidence should be suppressed in a particular case, or in general, is thus
a question for the law of remedies.”). Finally, the strongest form of the Simmons principle, which
prohibits making the exercise of one right contingent on the waiver of another, is fundamentally
inconsistent with Bordenkircher, and perhaps plea bargaining generally, which permits such bargains
of rights for other rights. While I agree with the Simmons and Cunningham Courts that these respective
bargains of Fourth and First Amendment rights should be invalidated as impermissibly coercive,
these two decisions do not eviscerate the force of the argument that corruption concerns about
rights-commodification can distinguish permissible plea bargains from unconstitutional conditions.
Anticoercion is a backstop, necessary for constitutionality in any bargain with the government, but
under my framework, such bargains must also refrain from denigrating the value of constitutional
rights.
Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 358, 365 (1978).
See, e.g., Allison D. Redlich, False Confessions, False Guilty Pleas: Similarities and Differences, in POLICE
INTERROGATIONS AND CONFESSIONS: CURRENT RESEARCH, PRACTICE, AND POLICY 86, 99 (G.
Daniel Lassiter & Christian A. Meissner eds., 2010), http://www.albany.edu/scj/documents/
Chapter3Redlich2010APAbook.pdf (“Many scholars posit this choice between remaining in jail
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inquiry,245 I posit that perhaps the presence of coercion is not truly what
separates Turley and Lefkowitz from Bordenkircher. The economic aspect of the
burdens invalidated in Turley and Lefkowitz were also subject to an initial
anticommodification objection from corruption. By financially penalizing
the exercise of the Fifth Amendment right, the statutes in those cases
effectively set up a potential transaction under which incommensurable
goods (rights vs. money) would be exchanged.246 Furthermore, in both cases,
had the individuals accepted the government’s offer and waived their rights
to protect their financial interest, the effective purchase of rights would be
impermissibly value-denigrating, expressing a perceived value-equilibrium
between rights and money.247
By using the malleable concept of coercion, the Court is able to implicitly
express its disapproval of rights-commodification. This anticommodification
idea not only helps to resolve the tension between Turley and Lefkowitz one
the one hand and Bordenkircher on the other, but also it helps to reconcile the
apparent paradox in the juxtaposition of plea-bargaining jurisprudence with
the unconstitutional conditions doctrine. The corruption objection provides
a principled means of distinguishing between cases like AID, where the
government attempts to purchase rights, and plea bargains, which amount
to an exchange of “goods” (i.e. constitutional rights) subject to the same mode
of valuation.248
C. Federalism and the Commodification of Constitutional Structure
The most politically salient unconstitutional conditions issues in recent
memory have arisen not in the context of individual rights, but rather in the
context of Federalism. First, in the 2012 case of NFIB v. Sebelius,249 the Court
determined that the “Medicaid Expansion” provision of the Affordable Care
Act (“ACA”) violated the unconstitutional conditions doctrine.250 As noted
above, the NFIB case was groundbreaking: never before had the Court found
that the federal government violated the Constitution by conditioning
funding to states on their acquiescence to a federal policy demand.251

245
246
247
248
249
250
251

awaiting a trial (in which they are likely to be found guilty) and a reduced sentence or probation via
a guilty plea is one of coercion.”).
See Cohen, The Price of Everything, supra note 31, at 691.
Cf. supra notes 147–49 and accompanying text.
Cf. supra notes 166, 167, 193 and accompanying text.
Cf. TRIBE & MATZ, supra note 10, at 270; Westermann, supra note 41, at 6.
NFIB v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519 (2012).
See supra notes 74–82 and accompanying text.
See supra note 82 and accompanying text.
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More recently, the Trump Administration reignited public interest in this
obscure area of doctrine by issuing an executive order that threatened to
withhold federal funds from “sanctuary jurisdictions,” such as Chicago, New
York, Los Angeles, and San Francisco, unless those cities agree to assist
federal efforts to deport undocumented immigrants.252 In November 2017,
Judge Orrick of the Northern District of California enjoined enforcement of
the sanctuary cities executive order as a violation of the unconstitutional
conditions doctrine (among other things).253 In doing so, he relied on NFIB
to conclude that the Administration’s funding threat was “unconstitutionally
coercive.”254 Judge Orrick’s reasoning closely tracks the Court’s analysis in
NFIB: the executive order violates the Constitution because (1) compliance
with federal immigration law was “not an unambiguous condition that the
states and local jurisdictions voluntarily and knowingly accepted at the time
Congress appropriated these funds”; (2) there was an insufficient nexus
between such compliance and most federal funding to the county-plaintiffs;

252

253

254

See Exec. Order. No. 13768 § 9(a), 82 FR 8799, 8801 (Jan. 25, 2017); Diamond & McKirdy, supra
note 11; Ilya Somin, Federal Court Rules that Trump’s Executive Order Targeting Sanctuary Cities Is
Unconstitutional, WASH. POST (Nov. 21, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokhconspiracy/wp/2017/11/21/federal-court-rules-that-trumps-executive-order-targetingsanctuary-cities-is-unconstitutional/?utm_term=.2cea5a90ce99.
Cty. of Santa Clara v. Trump, 275 F. Supp. 3d 1196 (N.D. Cal. 2017). The scope of the injunction
was nationwide. Id. at 1219. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court decision but vacated the
nationwide injunction due to an absence of sufficient findings to support nationwide application.
See Cty. of Santa Clara v. Trump, 897 F.3d 1225, 1231 (9th Cir. 2018).
Cty. of Santa Clara, 275 F. Supp. 3d. at 1202. Notably, two months earlier, Judge Harry D.
Leinenweber of the Northern District of Illinois had issued a nationwide preliminary injunction
against enforcement of the executive order. City of Chicago v. Sessions, 264 F. Supp. 3d. 933, 946
(N.D. Ill. 2017). Judge Leinenweber’s decision, however, did not reach the unconstitutional
conditions issue. See id. at 943 (“We do no reach the question whether the notice and access
conditions violate the Spending Clause because, regardless, Congress did not authorize the
Attorney General to impose them.”); id. at 946 (“As the City has not argued that the compliance
condition violates the Spending Clause, the Court now turns to the [statutory] question.”). The
Seventh Circuit affirmed the grant of preliminary relief against the executive order (without relying
on the unconstitutional conditions doctrine). See City of Chicago v. Sessions, 888 F.3d 272, 293
(7th Cir. 2018). In June of 2018, the Seventh Circuit agreed to review en banc the narrow question
“whether the preliminary injunction issued by the district court was properly applied beyond the
City of Chicago to encompass jurisdictions nationwide.” City of Chicago v. Sessions, No. 17-2991,
2018 WL 4268817, *1 (7th Cir. June 4, 2018). Most recently, in December 2018, Judge Edgardo
Ramos of the Southern District of New York similarly ruled that the executive order was
unconstitutional, granting summary judgment to a coalition of states and New York City in two
consolidated cases. See New York v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 343 F. Supp. 3d 213, 221 (S.D.N.Y.
2018). Judge Ramos’s reasoning does not rely on the unconstitutional conditions doctrine; instead,
he concluded that the (1) executive order was not authorized by statute; (2) even if it were, such
authorization would be unconstitutional under the “anticommandeering doctrine”; and (3) the
executive order was arbitrary and capricious in violation of the Administrative Procedure Act. Id.
at 227–41.
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and (3) the threat to deny “hundreds of millions of dollars” was “so coercive
as to pass the point at which pressure turns to compulsion.”255
Unlike the individual rights cases described above, it is explicitly clear
from cases like NFIB and County of Santa Clara that anti-coercion, rather than
anti-corruption, is the primary normative underpinning of the
unconstitutional conditions doctrine in Federalism cases. In NFIB, for example,
the Court couched its constitutional criticism of the Medicaid expansion in
unequivocally consent-based language: “In this case, the financial
‘inducement’ Congress has chosen is much more than ‘relatively mild
encouragement’—it is a gun to the head.”256
As a normative matter, however, the Court’s preoccupation with “states’
rights” qua autonomy (i.e. a purely anti-coercion, consent-based theory of
unconstitutional conditions) is misguided, and anti-commodification
discourse can help us understand why. First, as prior scholarship has
foreshadowed,257 the lexicon of distributive equality fits much better with
Federalism-based unconstitutional conditions cases than liberty-based
arguments about the purity of states’ consent. Instead, the Federalism
principle embodied in the Tenth Amendment should be understood as
reifying a particular structural distribution of powers between the federal
government and the states, and the Constitution intends that distribution to
be permanent, rather than subjected to a market-based system of exchange.
Just as in the market for consumer goods, there are distributive consequences
to “marketizing” the federal-state distribution of power: in such a market, the
party with greater financial means have more access to the “good” in
question. So too with the allocation of powers between the Federal
government and the States—were we to allow the logic of the bargain to
operate without constraint, the distribution of powers embodied in Article I
and preserved by the Tenth Amendment would be reduced to an initial
distribution, which the states and Congress can redistribute according to the
logic of market exchanges.258

255
256
257

258

Cty. of Santa Clara, 275 F. Supp. 3d. at 1215 (quoting South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 211
(1987)).
NFIB v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 581 (2012).
See Sullivan, supra note 21, at 1492 n.342 (“The discussion that follows focuses on individual rights,
but a parallel argument could be made about the preservation of state autonomy against federal
encroachment. However broad or shrunken the reigning conception of the sphere of state
autonomy, the argument would go, the federal government is barred from invading that sphere in
order to preserve the values of diversity and local variation embodied in federalism.”).
This Section is adapted from a paper I wrote for the Constitutional Silences seminar at Harvard Law
School in Fall 2015. Seminar: Constitutional Silences: Mapping Negative Legal Space, Harvard
Law School, Nov. 4, 2015.
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At the same time, although the corruption objection to commodification
is perhaps more intuitively appealing in the context of individual rights than
in Federalism, anticorruption provides further normative justification for a
robust doctrine of Federalism-based unconstitutional conditions. Just as the
free speech rights protected by the First Amendment are degraded by their
valuation in financial terms, the Constitution also arguably ensconces certain
Federalist values as “civic goods” via the Tenth Amendment. By “reserv[ing]
to the States respectively, or to the people” any “powers not delegated to the
United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States,”259 the
Constitution expresses an implicit judgment that “the values of diversity and
local variation embodied in federalism” should be considered civic virtues.260
The anticorruption objection to commodification explains why the
unconstitutional conditions doctrine should prohibit the federal government
to bargain for the sale of these governmental virtues as commodities.
If this anticommodificationist justification for the unconstitutional
conditions doctrine is taken seriously in the Federalism context, then the
wisdom of Judge Orrick’s decision, along with the wisdom of NFIB, becomes
apparent. In fact, the anticommodificationist approach to these cases
vindicates Justice Brennan’s dissent in South Dakota v. Dole,261 perhaps the
seminal unconstitutional conditions Federalism case, which invented the
much-maligned “nexus” test in upholding a condition on federal highway
funding.262 A principled anticommodificationist would agree with Justice
Brennan that “regulation of the minimum age of purchasers of liquor falls
squarely within the ambit of those powers reserved to the States by the
Twenty-first Amendment. Since States possess this constitutional power,
Congress cannot condition a federal grant in a manner that abridges this
right. The Amendment, itself, strikes the proper balance between federal
and state authority.”263 In some ways, recent unconstitutional conditions
cases may signal a turn in the direction of Justice Brennan’s approach to these
questions.

259
260

261
262

263

U.S. CONST. amend. X.
Sullivan, supra note 21, at 1492 n.342; see also Heather K. Gerken, Windsor’s Mad Genius: The
Interlocking Gears of Rights and Structure, 95 B.U. L. REV. 587, 594 (2015) (describing how Federalist
structure promotes dialogue and integration through “discursive benefits of structure”).
483 U.S. 203 (1987).
See TRIBE & MATZ, supra note 10, at 278 (explaining Brennan’s pro-Federalism vote in Dole by his
attention to “legal design,” reasoning that he saw “little distinction between threats to the states and
threats to individuals: bribery that threatened one constitutional restriction posted a threat to all
constitutional restrictions”).
Dole, 483 U.S. at 212.
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IV. UNCONSTITUTIONAL CONDITIONS AS ANTICOMMODIFICATION: A
NORMATIVE DEFENSE
Prior scholarship on unconstitutional conditions has generally rejected
anticommodification discourse as a theoretical justification for the doctrine.
As this Article demonstrates, however, more recent developments in
anticommodification discourse can add significantly to our understanding of
the theoretical groundwork for enigmatic questions of unconstitutional
conditions.264 Finally, this Section seeks to prove that anticommodification
arguments are not only descriptively relevant but also are a normatively
desirable theory for approaching unconstitutional conditions questions.
Other commentators, by largely overlooking the explanatory power of
anticommodification discourse, have failed to fully comprehend the nature
of the corruption objection, and thus have brushed over the nuanced
differences between different positions on the Nature of the Good
spectrum.265 Sullivan, for example, described the anti-commodification
argument as “the view that some attributes are so closely connected to the
person that their alienation would injure personal identity.”266 Reasoning
that “constitutional rights are not generally thought of as sacred or as gifts,”
she therefore proceeded on the mistaken assumption that the corruption
objection (or what she called “personhood theory”) can be used to justify
unconstitutional conditions doctrine only if one accepts the pseudo-Kantian
argument that some rights are too closely associated with human dignity to
be more morally alienable.267
Past scholars have also generally dismissed the corruption argument
against rights-commodification out of solicitude for “decisional autonomy”
as the foundational value animating the constitutional rights at stake in
unconstitutional conditions questions:268
Because these [constitutional] rights protect the decision itself, the distinction
between exercise of a right and its waiver or sale is blurred. The less clear
the distinction, the more barring sale will interfere with rather than protect
the seller’s rights. Scrutiny of the reasons one chooses to worship or not, or
to carry a pregnancy to term or abort, for example, appears inconsistent with
protecting individual sovereignty over the decision. . . . Declaring a
constitutional right nonrelinquishable for the rightholder’s own good thus

264
265
266
267
268

See generally Radin & Sunder, supra note 113 (charting the evolution of the commodification debate);
SANDEL, supra note 31, at 202–03.
See supra notes 158–62 and accompanying text.
Sullivan, supra note 21, at 1484–85.
Id.
Id. at 1486.

May 2019]

CONTRACTING AROUND THE CONSTITUTION

1211

contradicts the premise of the rightholder’s exclusive jurisdiction over those
questions. . . .
Put another way, making decisions inalienable creates duties. . . . But
such duty-creation is inappropriate for constitutional liberties that consist of
freedom for potential private decisions, rather than freedom from them. To
oblige the exercise of speech or privacy rights would misconstrue their
meaning. If the right to divulge the secrets of government employment is
deemed inalienable—for example, in order to prevent government from
insulating itself from public criticism—is Snepp then obliged to speak?269 If
the abortion right is deemed inalienable—for example, in order to equalize
the power relationship between men and women on the whole—are
pregnant women obliged to choose abortion?270

This rejection of an anticommodification justification for
unconstitutional conditions doctrine is misguided for at least two reasons.
First, the concerns articulated above about creating obligations to exercise
constitutional rights like speech or abortion, misconstrue that nature of the
anticommodification argument by virtually ignoring the corruption
objection: the corruption argument against rights commodification does not
object to a rightsholder’s ability to decline to exercise her right to speak or
her right to have an abortion.271 Instead, the corruption argument objects
much more narrowly to the exchange of a right for a lower-value good (such
as a monetary benefits) because such an exchange expresses a valuedenigrating conception of the right.272
In the abortion rights context, for example, an anticommodificationist
might express concern over the fact that federal funds must be used to
subsidize childbirth costs even though states can decline to fund medically
necessary abortions. But the anticommodificationist’s objection is grounded
in the fact that this funding disparity effectively translates into a
governmental purchase of abortion-rights waivers.273
This
269

270

271
272
273

Sullivan is alluding to Snepp v. United States, 44 U.S. 507 (1980), in which the Supreme Court rejected
a former CIA agent’s argument that the First Amendment prohibited enforcement of an
employment agreement he signed with the Agency, which “expressly obligated him to submit any
proposed publication for prior review” by the CIA. See id. at 509 n.3; see also Jonathan C. Medow,
The First Amendment and the Secrecy State, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 775, 776 (1982).
Sullivan, supra note 21, at 1486–87. Here, Sullivan is apparently alluding to Harris v. McRae, 448
U.S. 297 (1980), in which the Court upheld the constitutionality of the Hyde Amendment, which
restricted the use of federal funds under Medicaid to pay for abortions, despite the fact that childbirth
medical costs were funded by a “a comprehensive medical benefits program.” Laurence H. Tribe,
The Abortion Funding Conundrum: Inalienable Rights, Affirmative Duties, and the Dilemma of Dependence, 99
HARV. L. REV. 330, 337 (1985).
See supra Part II.
Cf. supra notes 157–58 and accompanying text (discussing the Nature of the Goods Formulation)
and notes 165–68 and accompanying text (discussing the Nature of the Transaction objection).
See Tribe, supra note 270, at 336–37 (“That holding [in Harris v. McRae] was rendered especially
dubious by the government’s simultaneous decision—at considerable net public cost—to

1212

JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

[Vol. 21:5

anticommodificationist position is fully consistent with concerns for
individual decisional autonomy, but it also recognizes that individual
autonomy is not the only value at stake in debates about rightscommodification; society may also want to preserve the character of
constitutional rights as “sacred” and/or “civic” goods by prohibiting valuedenigrating exchanges.274 Of course, the idea that some exchanges involving
rights are off-limits is an inherently normative value judgment, requiring a
tradeoff between pure decisional autonomy275 and commitment to civic
values.276
Second, even if it were correct that anticommodification arguments are
in tension with “the premise of the rightholder’s exclusive jurisdiction” over
decisions whether to affirmatively exercise her rights, it is an
oversimplification to imagine that the only reason society might “[d]eclar[e]
a constitutional right nonrelinquishable” is to promote “the rightholder’s
own good.”277
Instead, we might declare a constitutional right
nonrelinquishable to insulate rights, as civic goods, from value-denigration
by blocking their exchange in return for economic benefits. This clarification
of the actual value-tradeoffs at stake in debates about the commodification
of rights points to the second shortcoming of Sullivan’s commodification
analysis: she incorrectly presumes that the Constitution requires
maximization of individual autonomy and concomitant rejection of “duty
creation.”278

274
275
276
277
278

take childbirth for the same poor women off the private market by funding the necessary medical
care within a comprehensive medical benefits program.”); supra note 270.
Cf. supra note 161 and accompanying text.
Cf. supra notes 93–94 and accompanying text; see also Easterbrook, supra note 94, at 347. See generally
Epstein, supra note 168.
See, e.g., SANDEL, supra note 31, at 203.
Sullivan, supra note 21, at 1486.
Id. at 1487; cf. Radin, supra note 1087, at 1854 n.21 (“Nontransferable rights that at the same time
may implicate affirmative duties fall into a category I think of as community-inalienability.
Examples are the right-duty to vote in political elections and the right-duty to become educated.”).
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Individual autonomy is undoubtedly a core constitutional value,279
undergirding much of our constitutional rights jurisprudence, including the
areas of free speech,280 gay marriage,281 privacy,282 abortion,283 and certain
aspects of constitutional criminal procedure.284 It is a mistake, however, to
assume that constitutional rights exist solely to maximize rightsholders’

279

280

281
282

283

284

See, e.g., Jessica Wilen Berg, Understanding Waiver, 40 HOUS. L. REV. 281, 286–87 & n.21 (2003)
(claiming that “[a]utonomy is the basic value underlying liberal society” and that “autonomy forms
the basis for our system of laws and does so appropriately.”); Rogers M. Smith, The Constitution and
Autonomy, 60 TEX. L. REV. 175 (1982) (“The rise of autonomy as a fundamental value can be
discerned not only in cases involving contraception, abortion, and other family and life-style issues,
and in the reliance on privacy conceptions in recent fourth and fifth amendment cases.”); see also
Laurence H. Tribe, Equal Dignity: Speaking Its Name, 129 HARV. L. REV. FORUM 16, 22 (2015)
(identifying “the idea that all individuals are deserving in equal measure of personal autonomy and
freedom to ‘define [their] own concept of existence’ ” as an important aspect of the fundamental
rights jurisprudence of Justice Kennedy in particular).
See, e.g., Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Grp. of Bos., 515 U.S. 557, 573 (1995)
(holding the state court’s application of state public accommodation law to require inclusion of gay,
lesbian, and bisexual descendants of Irish immigrants in a privately-organized St. Patrick’s Day
parade “violate[d] the fundamental rule of protection under the First Amendment, that a speaker
has the autonomy to choose the content of his own message” (emphasis added)); Ariz. Free Enter. Club’s
Freedom Club PAC v. Bennett, 564 U.S. 721, 739 (2011) (same) (quoting Hurley, 515 U.S. at 573);
see also Robert Post, Meiklejohn’s Mistake: Individual Autonomy and the Reform of Public Discourse, 64 U.
COLO. L. REV. 1109, 1137 (1993) (describing the “quaint focus on autonomy” of “[t]raditional
First Amendment doctrine” and noting Supreme Court’s hostility to a less individualistic,
autonomy-based First Amendment jurisprudence); Geoffrey R. Stone, Autonomy and Distrust, 64 U.
COLO. L. REV. 1171, 1172 (1993) (disagreeing with Post that Court has adopted a “pure autonomy
mode” and arguing instead that Court’s jurisprudence represents “a variation . . . that combines
the concern with autonomy with a deep distrust of government efforts to regulate public debate.”).
See Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2599 (2015) (“[T]he right to personal choice regarding
marriage is inherent in the concept of individual autonomy.”).
See, e.g., Carey v. Population Servs., Int’l, 431 U.S. 678, 687 (1977) (“Read in light of its progeny,
the teaching of Griswold is that the Constitution protects individual decisions in matters of
childbearing from unjustified intrusion by the State.”); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479,
485–86 (1965); June Aline Eichman, Towards an Autonomy-Based Theory of Constitutional Privacy: Beyond
the Ideology of Family Privacy, 14 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 361, 362 (1979) (arguing “that only an
autonomy-based right is normatively acceptable, because a family-based right is subservient to
majoritarian sentiment, and therefore ultimately fails to vindicate the privacy interests of the
individual”). See generally Louis Henkin, Privacy and Autonomy, 74 COLUM. L. REV. 1410 (1974);
SANDEL, supra note 206, at ch. 4 (describing evolution of Court’s privacy jurisprudence from
Griswold onwards, and noting rise of an autonomy-based notion of privacy).
See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 857 (1992) (“Roe, however, may be seen
not only as an exemplar of Griswold liberty but as a rule (whether or not mistaken) of personal
autonomy and bodily integrity, with doctrinal affinity to cases recognizing limits on governmental
power to mandate medical treatment or to bar its rejection.”); see also Reva B. Siegel, Dignity and the
Politics of Protection: Abortion Restrictions Under Casey/Carhart, 117 YALE L.J. 1694, 1701 (2008) (noting
Casey protects “forms of decisional autonomy” for women).
See, e.g., Berg, supra note 279, at 322 (claiming goal of doctrinal rules like Miranda warnings and Sixth
Amendment right to trial waiver doctrine is to protect individual autonomy); Smith, supra note 279,
at 175 & n.6 (identifying Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979), Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347
(1967), and Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 460 (1966) as autonomy-driven decisions).
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decisional autonomy.285 For despite the centrality of autonomy in our
constitutional value system, autonomy-maximization must be balanced
against other significant constitutional values. For example, in the context of
a criminal defendant’s right to self-representation, as recognized by Faretta v.
California,286 the autonomy value animating the right must be balanced to
some extent against the criminal justice system’s interest in “fairness, order,
efficiency, and accurate outcomes”287; for this reason, the Court held in
Martinez v. Court of Appeal of California288 that Faretta’s right to selfrepresentation did not extend to appellate cases. Furthermore, as Margaret
Radin argues, some rights, such as the right to vote, actually might be better
conceptualized simultaneously as duties that “ought to be exercised.”289 The
set of rights that fall into this category of “right-duties” will likely be more
expansive if “one’s views about the nature of the person and the nature of
social life” are more communitarian; still, with respect to voting at least, there
seems to be a general societal consensus that commodification should be
impermissible, despite the undeniably “autonomy-restricting effect” such
market-inalienability rules have on individual voters.290
Nor should we reject the anticommodification objection to
unconstitutional conditions on the grounds that barring exchanges of rights
would place individuals under duties.291 This aversion to “duty-creation” is
symptomatic of a wholly individualistic, autonomy-maximization theory of
constitutional rights, which simply fails to account for the structural,
relational nature of certain rights.292 Once one recognizes that certain rights
285
286
287
288

289
290
291
292

See Sullivan, supra note 21, at 1486–87. See generally Berg, supra note 279, at 285 (developing an
approach to waiver of rights “designed to maximize individual autonomy”).
422 U.S. 806 (1975).
Robert E. Toone, The Incoherence of Defendant Autonomy, 83 N.C. L. REV. 621, 622 (2005).
528 U.S. 152, 153 (2000) (“[A]lthough Faretta’s conclusion that a knowing and intelligent waiver of
the right to trial counsel must be honored out of respect for individual autonomy, [Faretta] is also
applicable in the appellate context, this Court has recognized that the right is not absolute . . . .”
(internal citation omitted) (citing Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 834 (1975))).
See Radin, supra note 108, at 1854 n.21.
Karlan, supra note 208, at 1460.
See id.; Radin, supra note 108, at 1854 n.21.
This failure is rendered all the more puzzling by the fact that Sullivan herself describes
contemporaneous literature on structural, or relational, conceptions of rights, including Kreimer,
supra note 96, Tribe, supra note 270, and others who “have argued for limits on government
employees’ power to sell their rights to divulge information about government acquired on the job,
on the ground that the First Amendment protects more than speaker autonomy: it embodies a
structural interest in well-informed public deliberation that even voluntary waivers will hinder.”
Sullivan, supra note 21, at 1479. To be fair, Sullivan’s preferred theory of unconstitutional
conditions as protecting a systemic distribution of constitutional liberty has a strong affinity with
these conceptions of rights as structural or relational. See id. at 1506. Even so, her analysis papers
over the relational conception of rights as a possible justification for imposing duties of
nonwaiveability on rightsholders when in her discussion of commodification; she simply states
“[t]he relationship between ‘structural’ or ‘relational’ concerns and inalienability, however, remains
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serve a structural, relational, and public purpose, rather than a solely
individual-regarding purpose, then the imposition of an individual duty to
refrain from exchanging rights does not seem as problematic as prior
scholarship has assumed. In fact, as a descriptive matter, a relational
understanding of constitutional rights has actually motivated courts to strike
down certain conditional waivers of rights as unconstitutional. Thomas
Merrill, for example, argues “when constitutional rights are perceived by
courts as having a large public goods293 dimension, courts will be reluctant to
enforce contracts in which individuals waive the exercise of the right in
exchange for some discretionary benefit.”294
Other scholars have also argued in a normative register that certain rights
should be nonwaiveable because they are relational, rather than individual,
and serve compelling public values. Laurence Tribe, for example, argues
that certain rights are “relational and systemic” and therefore nonwaiveable
by individuals, given that “individuals are not their sole focus.”295 Rights
such as those guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection
Clause and the First Amendment’s Establishment Clause correspond to
“systemic norms,” which protect not just decisional autonomy, but also the
“structur[e] of power relationships to avoid the creation or perpetuation of
hierarchy in which some perennially dominate others.”296 As Tribe argues,
the systemic, relational character of rights like equal protection and due

293

294

295

296

unclear.” Id. at 1479. And while she promises that “the next sections [will] explore whether
arguments for inalienability in the context of private market relationships can help to support
arguments for inalienability in the unconstitutional conditions context,” see id., the article never
revisits the relevance of the relational-rights theory.
Under Merrill’s analysis, rights have a large public goods dimension when “the exercise of the right
not only produces a private benefit for the rights-holder, but also generates positive externalities
that benefit third parties or society more generally.” Merrill, supra note 212, at 862.
Id.; see also Robert F. Nagel, A Comment on “Constitutional Rights as Public Goods,” 72 DENV. U. L. REV.
889 (1995) (arguing that Merrill’s analysis results in a paradox where the “more crucial a right is to
[ ] an individual, the more free the government should be to induce [an individual] not to exercise
it”); David L. Shapiro, Courts, Legislatures and Paternalism, 74 VA. L. REV. 519, 573 (1988) (noting, in
analysis of waiveability of constitutional rights, “the willingness of the courts to expand notions of
standing in the first amendment area reflects an awareness of the interests of third persons and the
public generally in unrestricted speech.”).
Tribe, supra note 270, at 333; see also Hamburger, supra note 15, at 538–39 (arguing against
“assumption that constitutional rights are [even] sometimes of merely personal interest” because
rights exist to benefit “all persons within the protection of the law, including the groups and
organizations formed by individuals” and “the rights protected by American constitutions were
understood as limits on government imposed by the people” that cannot be waived by individual
consent); cf. Radin, supra note 107, at 1854 n.21 (“Nontransferable rights that at the same time may
implicate affirmative duties fall into a category I think of as community-inalienability . . . the more
communitarian one’s views about the nature of the person and the nature of social life, the more
all justifiable inalienabilities will be related to community.”). As examples of community inalienable
rights, Radin identifies “the right-duty to vote in political elections and the right-duty to become
educated.” Id.
Tribe, supra note 270, at 332–33 & n.14.
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process militate against their treatment as market goods, which can be
waived in exchange for money.297 For this reason, the franchise cannot be
restricted to those who pay a poll tax nor can access to divorce costs be
contingent on payment of court fees.298 Similarly, Jason Mazzone has argued
for a “value-oriented approach to waiver” of constitutional rights, under
which an “individual should not be permitted to waive a . . . right if waiver
would, under the circumstances presented, undermine a substantial public
value the right protects.”299 On this view, an individual may freely waive
their rights only if no compelling public value is at stake.300
When one acknowledges that other systemic values besides individual
decisional autonomy underlie certain constitutional rights, then the
imposition of duties prohibiting waiver on rightsholders seems justified.

297

298
299
300

Id. at 334 (“Yet it is equally clear that government’s freedom to leave distribution to the market
does not extend, under our Constitution, to all the things someone might need in order to exercise
various constitutional rights—even those not clearly rendered affirmative by the constitutional text
itself.”); see also Steven G. Gey, Contracting Away Rights: A Comment on Daniel Farber’s “Another View of the
Quagmire,” 33 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 953, 954–55 (2006) (arguing that, in addition to the individualregarding function of rights, another “equally important function of rights is to structure the
government’s relationship with the entire citizenry-including those who have no immediate
intention of exercising the rights in question”). Sullivan’s normative justification of unconstitutional
conditions doctrine as a means of preventing redistribution does have some resonance with
Professor Tribe relational rights argument, but Sullivan’s approach, unlike mine, “focuses not on
whether rights may ever be alienated, but rather on whether government may redistribute them.”
Sullivan, supra note 21, at 1491 n. 336.
Tribe, supra note 270, at 334–35 (citing Harper v. Va. State Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966));
Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971)).
Mazzone, supra note 169, at 865.
Id.
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CONCLUSION
If the goal of this Article were to untwine the Gordian Knot of the
unconstitutional conditions doctrine, it certainly did (and perhaps inevitably
would) fail. The goal here was considerably more modest, however, aiming
at least to pull loose a few more threads. In pursuit of this goal, the Article
marshaled anticommodification discourse and attempted to recover its
relevance, despite its rejection by previous scholars. Consequently, the
premise was partially normative: for reasons grounded in either individual
dignity or civic values, constitutional rights should not be treated as
commodities. Yet even if these normative arguments are rejected, the Article
suggests that there is strong evidence that, at least in the First Amendment
and Federalism contexts, the arguments against constitutional
commodification have explanatory power in understanding how the Court
has treated unconstitutional conditions questions. This explanation of the
doctrine resonates with and provides additional normative support for the
arguments made by scholars301 against the permissibility of even voluntary
exchanges of rights, especially free speech rights, for financial benefits. In
addition, the anticommodification approach elucidates an aspect of the
waiver paradox, providing a principled means of distinguishing
impermissible unconstitutional conditions from permissible plea bargains.
This Article also has further implications to be explored in later research.
For example, the anticommodification corruption objection to rights
commodification also explains and normatively justifies the Court’s stricter
approach to unconstitutional questions in fundamental rights contexts, like
Free Speech, as compared to constitutionally-protected economic rights, like
those secured by the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment.302 Because
the Takings Clause protects an economic right, money is by definition an
adequate substitute for the right. Therefore, concerns about valuedenigration do not apply in Takings cases. The ideas in this paper also carry
doctrinal implications: if accepted, the premise of the corruption argument
against commodification of rights would require revision of certain
constitutional doctrines, such as the “abortion funding cases” and

301

302

Hamburger, supra note 15, at 480–81 (“It . . . becomes apparent, at least as to rights and structural
limits, that consent is irrelevant.”); Mayer, supra note 101, at 1049 (“[T]he government is not
permitted to buy an organization’s speech absent a compelling governmental interest in doing so
and then only if the purchase is done in a manner that is narrowly tailored to serve that interest.”).
See Westermann, supra note 41, at 15 (purporting to “resolve[ ] the apparent inconsistency in the
way the Court applies the unconstitutional conditions doctrine strictly with respect to First
Amendment rights but flexibly with respect to constitutionally protected economic rights such as
entitlements related to land use”).
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unconstitutional conditions cases involving Fourth Amendment waivers.303
Although these threads of the unconstitutional conditions knot must (for now)
remain in Gordian entanglement, hopefully this paper provided some tools,
if not the proverbial Alexandrian sword, to aid future efforts.

303

See, e.g., Wyman v. James, 400 U.S. 309 (1971) (upholding mandatory home visits by welfare officials
as condition of receiving public benefits); see id. at 327–28 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (“Whatever the
semantics, the central question is whether the government by force of its largesse has the power to
‘buy up’ rights guaranteed by the Constitution.”); cf. Steven D. Schwinn, Reconstructing the
Constitutional Case Against Mandatory Welfare Home Visits, 42 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. J. POVERTY L. &
POL’Y 42 (2008).

